/** * @license AngularJS v1.8.0 * (c) 2010-2020 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org * License: MIT */ (function(window, angular) {'use strict'; /* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. * * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. * * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying * * this file is required. * * * * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? * * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? * * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize'); var bind; var extend; var forEach; var isArray; var isDefined; var lowercase; var noop; var nodeContains; var htmlParser; var htmlSanitizeWriter; /** * @ngdoc module * @name ngSanitize * @description * * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML. * * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage. */ /** * @ngdoc service * @name $sanitize * @kind function * * @description * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens. * * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are * then serialized back to a properly escaped HTML string. This means that no unsafe input can make * it into the returned string. * * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link $compileProvider}. * * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}. * * @param {string} html HTML input. * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML. * * @example
Snippet:
Directive How Source Rendered
ng-bind-html Automatically uses $sanitize
<div ng-bind-html="snippet">
</div>
ng-bind-html Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value
<div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()">
</div>
ng-bind Automatically escapes
<div ng-bind="snippet">
</div>
it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() { expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). toBe('

an html\nclick here\nsnippet

'); }); it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() { expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). toBe("

an html\n" + "click here\n" + "snippet

"); }); it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() { expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + "snippet</p>"); }); it('should update', function() { element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new text'); expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')). toBe('new text'); expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( 'new text'); expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe( "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>"); });
*/ /** * @ngdoc provider * @name $sanitizeProvider * @this * * @description * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance. */ function $SanitizeProvider() { var hasBeenInstantiated = false; var svgEnabled = false; this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) { hasBeenInstantiated = true; if (svgEnabled) { extend(validElements, svgElements); } return function(html) { var buf = []; htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) { return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage)); })); return buf.join(''); }; }]; /** * @ngdoc method * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg * @kind function * * @description * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer. * *
*

By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.

* *

To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg * tags within the sanitized content:

* *
* *

   *   .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg {
   *     overflow: hidden !important;
   *   }
   *   
*
* * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer. * @returns {boolean|$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise. */ this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) { if (isDefined(enableSvg)) { svgEnabled = enableSvg; return this; } else { return svgEnabled; } }; /** * @ngdoc method * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidElements * @kind function * * @description * Extends the built-in lists of valid HTML/SVG elements, i.e. elements that are considered safe * and are not stripped off during sanitization. You can extend the following lists of elements: * * - `htmlElements`: A list of elements (tag names) to extend the current list of safe HTML * elements. HTML elements considered safe will not be removed during sanitization. All other * elements will be stripped off. * * - `htmlVoidElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but marks the elements as * "void elements" (similar to HTML * [void elements](https://rawgit.com/w3c/html/html5.1-2/single-page.html#void-elements)). These * elements have no end tag and cannot have content. * * - `svgElements`: This is similar to `htmlElements`, but for SVG elements. This list is only * taken into account if SVG is {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for * `$sanitize`. * *
* This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the * `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect. *
* *
* Keep in mind that extending the built-in lists of elements may expose your app to XSS or * other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the elements you add. *
* * @param {Array|Object} elements - A list of valid HTML elements or an object with one or * more of the following properties: * - **htmlElements** - `{Array}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of * HTML elements. * - **htmlVoidElements** - `{Array}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of * void HTML elements; i.e. elements that do not have an end tag. * - **svgElements** - `{Array}` - A list of elements to extend the current list of SVG * elements. The list of SVG elements is only taken into account if SVG is * {@link ngSanitize.$sanitizeProvider#enableSvg enabled} for `$sanitize`. * * Passing an array (`[...]`) is equivalent to passing `{htmlElements: [...]}`. * * @return {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining. */ this.addValidElements = function(elements) { if (!hasBeenInstantiated) { if (isArray(elements)) { elements = {htmlElements: elements}; } addElementsTo(svgElements, elements.svgElements); addElementsTo(voidElements, elements.htmlVoidElements); addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlVoidElements); addElementsTo(validElements, elements.htmlElements); } return this; }; /** * @ngdoc method * @name $sanitizeProvider#addValidAttrs * @kind function * * @description * Extends the built-in list of valid attributes, i.e. attributes that are considered safe and are * not stripped off during sanitization. * * **Note**: * The new attributes will not be treated as URI attributes, which means their values will not be * sanitized as URIs using `$compileProvider`'s * {@link ng.$compileProvider#aHrefSanitizationWhitelist aHrefSanitizationWhitelist} and * {@link ng.$compileProvider#imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist}. * *
* This method must be called during the {@link angular.Module#config config} phase. Once the * `$sanitize` service has been instantiated, this method has no effect. *
* *
* Keep in mind that extending the built-in list of attributes may expose your app to XSS or * other vulnerabilities. Be very mindful of the attributes you add. *
* * @param {Array} attrs - A list of valid attributes. * * @returns {$sanitizeProvider} Returns self for chaining. */ this.addValidAttrs = function(attrs) { if (!hasBeenInstantiated) { extend(validAttrs, arrayToMap(attrs, true)); } return this; }; ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // Private stuff ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// bind = angular.bind; extend = angular.extend; forEach = angular.forEach; isArray = angular.isArray; isDefined = angular.isDefined; lowercase = angular.$$lowercase; noop = angular.noop; htmlParser = htmlParserImpl; htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl; nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) { // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16); }; // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character) NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g; // Good source of info about elements and attributes // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements // Safe Void Elements - HTML5 // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements var voidElements = stringToMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr'); // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves) // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags var optionalEndTagBlockElements = stringToMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'), optionalEndTagInlineElements = stringToMap('rp,rt'), optionalEndTagElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, optionalEndTagBlockElements); // Safe Block Elements - HTML5 var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, stringToMap('address,article,' + 'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' + 'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul')); // Inline Elements - HTML5 var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, stringToMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' + 'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' + 'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var')); // SVG Elements // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted. // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290 var svgElements = stringToMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' + 'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' + 'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan'); // Blocked Elements (will be stripped) var blockedElements = stringToMap('script,style'); var validElements = extend({}, voidElements, blockElements, inlineElements, optionalEndTagElements); //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized var uriAttrs = stringToMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href,xml:base'); var htmlAttrs = stringToMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' + 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' + 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' + 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' + 'valign,value,vspace,width'); // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes) // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes var svgAttrs = stringToMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' + 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' + 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' + 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' + 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' + 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' + 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' + 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' + 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' + 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' + 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' + 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' + 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' + 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' + 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true); var validAttrs = extend({}, uriAttrs, svgAttrs, htmlAttrs); function stringToMap(str, lowercaseKeys) { return arrayToMap(str.split(','), lowercaseKeys); } function arrayToMap(items, lowercaseKeys) { var obj = {}, i; for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true; } return obj; } function addElementsTo(elementsMap, newElements) { if (newElements && newElements.length) { extend(elementsMap, arrayToMap(newElements)); } } /** * Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing * Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this. * Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy * Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy */ var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) { var inertDocument; if (document && document.implementation) { inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert'); } else { throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document'); } var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body'); // Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element inertBodyElement.innerHTML = ''; if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) { return getInertBodyElement_XHR; } else { // Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '

'; if (inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) { return getInertBodyElement_DOMParser; } else { return getInertBodyElement_InertDocument; } } function getInertBodyElement_XHR(html) { // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `` do not get hoisted to the `` tag. html = '' + html; try { html = encodeURI(html); } catch (e) { return undefined; } var xhr = new window.XMLHttpRequest(); xhr.responseType = 'document'; xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false); xhr.send(null); var body = xhr.response.body; body.firstChild.remove(); return body; } function getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html) { // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `` do not get hoisted to the `` tag. html = '' + html; try { var body = new window.DOMParser().parseFromString(html, 'text/html').body; body.firstChild.remove(); return body; } catch (e) { return undefined; } } function getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html) { inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; // Support: IE 9-11 only // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11 if (document.documentMode) { stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement); } return inertBodyElement; } })(window, window.document); /** * @example * htmlParser(htmlString, { * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, * end: function(tag) {}, * chars: function(text) {}, * comment: function(text) {} * }); * * @param {string} html string * @param {object} handler */ function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) { if (html === null || html === undefined) { html = ''; } else if (typeof html !== 'string') { html = '' + html; } var inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); if (!inertBodyElement) return ''; //mXSS protection var mXSSAttempts = 5; do { if (mXSSAttempts === 0) { throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable'); } mXSSAttempts--; // trigger mXSS if it is going to happen by reading and writing the innerHTML html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html); } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML); var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild; while (node) { switch (node.nodeType) { case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes)); break; case 3: // TEXT NODE handler.chars(node.textContent); break; } var nextNode; if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) { if (node.nodeType === 1) { handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); } nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); if (!nextNode) { while (nextNode == null) { node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node); if (node === inertBodyElement) break; nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); if (node.nodeType === 1) { handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); } } } } node = nextNode; } while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) { inertBodyElement.removeChild(node); } } function attrToMap(attrs) { var map = {}; for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) { var attr = attrs[i]; map[attr.name] = attr.value; } return map; } /** * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or * element text. * @param value * @returns {string} escaped text */ function encodeEntities(value) { return value. replace(/&/g, '&'). replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) { var hi = value.charCodeAt(0); var low = value.charCodeAt(1); return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';'; }). replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) { return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';'; }). replace(//g, '>'); } /** * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string * @returns {object} in the form of { * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, * end: function(tag) {}, * chars: function(text) {}, * comment: function(text) {} * } */ function htmlSanitizeWriterImpl(buf, uriValidator) { var ignoreCurrentElement = false; var out = bind(buf, buf.push); return { start: function(tag, attrs) { tag = lowercase(tag); if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) { ignoreCurrentElement = tag; } if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) { out('<'); out(tag); forEach(attrs, function(value, key) { var lkey = lowercase(key); var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background'); if (validAttrs[lkey] === true && (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) { out(' '); out(key); out('="'); out(encodeEntities(value)); out('"'); } }); out('>'); } }, end: function(tag) { tag = lowercase(tag); if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) { out(''); } // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) { ignoreCurrentElement = false; } }, chars: function(chars) { if (!ignoreCurrentElement) { out(encodeEntities(chars)); } } }; } /** * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all. * * @param node Root element to process */ function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) { while (node) { if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) { var attrs = node.attributes; for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) { var attrNode = attrs[i]; var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase(); if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) { node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode); i--; l--; } } } var nextNode = node.firstChild; if (nextNode) { stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); } node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node); } } function getNonDescendant(propName, node) { // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants var nextNode = node[propName]; if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) { throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText); } return nextNode; } } function sanitizeText(chars) { var buf = []; var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop); writer.chars(chars); return buf.join(''); } // define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service angular.module('ngSanitize', []) .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider) .info({ angularVersion: '1.8.0' }); /** * @ngdoc filter * @name linky * @kind function * * @description * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/sftp/mailto` and * plain email address links. * * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed. * * @param {string} text Input text. * @param {string} [target] Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in. * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element. * * Can be one of: * * - `object`: A map of attributes * - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes * * If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of * the target parameter. * * * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text. * * @usage * * @example

Snippet:
Filter Source Rendered
linky filter
<div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky">
</div>
linky target
<div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'">
</div>
linky custom attributes
<div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}">
</div>
no filter
<div ng-bind="snippet">
</div>
angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize']) .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) { $scope.snippet = 'Pretty text with some links:\n' + 'http://angularjs.org/,\n' + 'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n' + 'another@somewhere.org,\n' + 'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'; $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/'; }]); it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() { expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' + 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4); }); it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() { expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()). toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' + 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0); }); it('should update', function() { element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.'); expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). toBe('new http://link.'); expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1); expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()) .toBe('new http://link.'); }); it('should work with the target property', function() { expect(element(by.id('linky-target')). element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()). toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank'); }); it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() { expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')). element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()). toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow'); }); */ angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) { var LINKY_URL_REGEXP = /((s?ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i, MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i; var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky'); var isDefined = angular.isDefined; var isFunction = angular.isFunction; var isObject = angular.isObject; var isString = angular.isString; return function(text, target, attributes) { if (text == null || text === '') return text; if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text); var attributesFn = isFunction(attributes) ? attributes : isObject(attributes) ? function getAttributesObject() {return attributes;} : function getEmptyAttributesObject() {return {};}; var match; var raw = text; var html = []; var url; var i; while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) { // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence url = match[0]; // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto if (!match[2] && !match[4]) { url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url; } i = match.index; addText(raw.substr(0, i)); addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, '')); raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length); } addText(raw); return $sanitize(html.join('')); function addText(text) { if (!text) { return; } html.push(sanitizeText(text)); } function addLink(url, text) { var key, linkAttributes = attributesFn(url); html.push(''); addText(text); html.push(''); } }; }]); })(window, window.angular);