/**
* @license AngularJS v1.6.7
* (c) 2010-2017 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org
* License: MIT
*/
(function(window, angular) {'use strict';
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. *
* Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. *
* An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying *
* this file is required. *
* *
* Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? *
* Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? *
* Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize');
var bind;
var extend;
var forEach;
var isDefined;
var lowercase;
var noop;
var nodeContains;
var htmlParser;
var htmlSanitizeWriter;
/**
* @ngdoc module
* @name ngSanitize
* @description
*
* The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML.
*
* See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage.
*/
/**
* @ngdoc service
* @name $sanitize
* @kind function
*
* @description
* Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens.
*
* The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are
* then serialized back to properly escaped html string. This means that no unsafe input can make
* it into the returned string.
*
* The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions
* `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link ng.$compileProvider
* `$compileProvider`}.
*
* The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}.
*
* @param {string} html HTML input.
* @returns {string} Sanitized HTML.
*
* @example
Snippet:
Directive
How
Source
Rendered
ng-bind-html
Automatically uses $sanitize
<div ng-bind-html="snippet"> </div>
ng-bind-html
Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value
it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() {
expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
toBe('
an html\nclick here\nsnippet
');
});
it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() {
expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
toBe("
an html\n" +
"click here\n" +
"snippet
");
});
it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() {
expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" +
"<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" +
"snippet</p>");
});
it('should update', function() {
element(by.model('snippet')).clear();
element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new text');
expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).
toBe('new text');
expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe(
'new text');
expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe(
"new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>");
});
*/
/**
* @ngdoc provider
* @name $sanitizeProvider
* @this
*
* @description
* Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance.
*/
function $SanitizeProvider() {
var svgEnabled = false;
this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) {
if (svgEnabled) {
extend(validElements, svgElements);
}
return function(html) {
var buf = [];
htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) {
return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage));
}));
return buf.join('');
};
}];
/**
* @ngdoc method
* @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg
* @kind function
*
* @description
* Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer.
*
*
*
By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your
* application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned
* outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login
* link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.
*
*
To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg
* tags within the sanitized content:
*
* @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer.
* @returns {boolean|ng.$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called
* without an argument or self for chaining otherwise.
*/
this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) {
if (isDefined(enableSvg)) {
svgEnabled = enableSvg;
return this;
} else {
return svgEnabled;
}
};
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Private stuff
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
bind = angular.bind;
extend = angular.extend;
forEach = angular.forEach;
isDefined = angular.isDefined;
lowercase = angular.lowercase;
noop = angular.noop;
htmlParser = htmlParserImpl;
htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl;
nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16);
};
// Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes
var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g,
// Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character)
NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g;
// Good source of info about elements and attributes
// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics
// http://simon.html5.org/html-elements
// Safe Void Elements - HTML5
// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements
var voidElements = toMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr');
// Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves)
// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags
var optionalEndTagBlockElements = toMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'),
optionalEndTagInlineElements = toMap('rp,rt'),
optionalEndTagElements = extend({},
optionalEndTagInlineElements,
optionalEndTagBlockElements);
// Safe Block Elements - HTML5
var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, toMap('address,article,' +
'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' +
'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul'));
// Inline Elements - HTML5
var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, toMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' +
'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' +
'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var'));
// SVG Elements
// https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements
// Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted.
// They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290
var svgElements = toMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' +
'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' +
'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan');
// Blocked Elements (will be stripped)
var blockedElements = toMap('script,style');
var validElements = extend({},
voidElements,
blockElements,
inlineElements,
optionalEndTagElements);
//Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized
var uriAttrs = toMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href');
var htmlAttrs = toMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' +
'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' +
'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' +
'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' +
'valign,value,vspace,width');
// SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes)
// https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes
var svgAttrs = toMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' +
'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' +
'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' +
'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' +
'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' +
'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' +
'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' +
'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' +
'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' +
'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' +
'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' +
'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' +
'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' +
'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' +
'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true);
var validAttrs = extend({},
uriAttrs,
svgAttrs,
htmlAttrs);
function toMap(str, lowercaseKeys) {
var obj = {}, items = str.split(','), i;
for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {
obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true;
}
return obj;
}
/**
* Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing
* Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this.
* Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy
* Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy
*/
var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) {
var inertDocument;
if (document && document.implementation) {
inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert');
} else {
throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document');
}
var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body');
// Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element
inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '';
if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) {
return getInertBodyElement_XHR;
} else {
// Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized
inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '