2006-05-01 12:38:19 +02:00
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/*
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* QEMU VNC display driver
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2007-09-16 23:08:06 +02:00
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*
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2006-05-01 12:38:19 +02:00
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Fabrice Bellard
|
2009-03-06 21:27:13 +01:00
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* Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc
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2007-09-16 23:08:06 +02:00
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*
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2006-05-01 12:38:19 +02:00
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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* in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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* to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
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* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
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* THE SOFTWARE.
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*/
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2009-03-06 21:27:13 +01:00
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#include "vnc.h"
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
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#include "vnc-jobs.h"
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
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#include "trace.h"
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
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#include "hw/qdev.h"
|
2012-12-17 18:20:04 +01:00
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|
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
|
2015-03-17 18:29:20 +01:00
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|
|
#include "qemu/error-report.h"
|
2012-12-17 18:20:00 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "qemu/sockets.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "qemu/timer.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "qemu/acl.h"
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "qemu/config-file.h"
|
2015-03-17 17:22:46 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h"
|
2012-12-17 18:19:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "qapi/qmp/types.h"
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "qmp-commands.h"
|
2012-12-17 18:20:00 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
|
2013-12-02 14:27:18 +01:00
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|
|
#include "ui/input.h"
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
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|
#include "qapi-event.h"
|
2015-07-01 19:10:36 +02:00
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|
#include "crypto/hash.h"
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
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#include "crypto/tlscredsanon.h"
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#include "crypto/tlscredsx509.h"
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|
#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
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|
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
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|
#define VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE GUI_REFRESH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
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|
|
#define VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_INC 50
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
#define VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX GUI_REFRESH_INTERVAL_IDLE
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
static const struct timeval VNC_REFRESH_STATS = { 0, 500000 };
|
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|
|
static const struct timeval VNC_REFRESH_LOSSY = { 2, 0 };
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
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|
|
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|
|
#include "vnc_keysym.h"
|
2015-07-01 19:10:38 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "crypto/cipher.h"
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static QTAILQ_HEAD(, VncDisplay) vnc_displays =
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|
QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(vnc_displays);
|
2007-02-05 21:20:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_cursor_define(VncState *vs);
|
2012-02-08 13:18:37 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_release_modifiers(VncState *vs);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_set_share_mode(VncState *vs, VncShareMode mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _VNC_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
static const char *mn[] = {
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|
|
|
[0] = "undefined",
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|
|
[VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING] = "connecting",
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|
|
[VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED] = "shared",
|
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|
|
[VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE] = "exclusive",
|
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|
|
[VNC_SHARE_MODE_DISCONNECTED] = "disconnected",
|
|
|
|
};
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "%s/%p: %s -> %s\n", __func__,
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, mn[vs->share_mode], mn[mode]);
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (vs->share_mode) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING:
|
|
|
|
vs->vd->num_connecting--;
|
|
|
|
break;
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|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED:
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|
|
vs->vd->num_shared--;
|
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|
break;
|
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|
|
case VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE:
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
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|
vs->vd->num_exclusive--;
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
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|
break;
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|
|
default:
|
|
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|
break;
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
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|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
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|
vs->share_mode = mode;
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
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|
switch (vs->share_mode) {
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case VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING:
|
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|
vs->vd->num_connecting++;
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|
break;
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case VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED:
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vs->vd->num_shared++;
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break;
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case VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE:
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
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|
vs->vd->num_exclusive++;
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
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|
break;
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default:
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|
break;
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
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}
|
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|
}
|
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|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
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|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_init_basic_info(SocketAddress *addr,
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
VncBasicInfo *info,
|
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
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switch (addr->type) {
|
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|
case SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_INET:
|
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|
info->host = g_strdup(addr->u.inet->host);
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info->service = g_strdup(addr->u.inet->port);
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|
if (addr->u.inet->ipv6) {
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info->family = NETWORK_ADDRESS_FAMILY_IPV6;
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|
} else {
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|
info->family = NETWORK_ADDRESS_FAMILY_IPV4;
|
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|
}
|
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|
break;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
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|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
case SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_UNIX:
|
|
|
|
info->host = g_strdup("");
|
|
|
|
info->service = g_strdup(addr->u.q_unix->path);
|
|
|
|
info->family = NETWORK_ADDRESS_FAMILY_UNIX;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported socket kind %d",
|
|
|
|
addr->type);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_init_basic_info_from_server_addr(QIOChannelSocket *ioc,
|
|
|
|
VncBasicInfo *info,
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SocketAddress *addr = NULL;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
addr = qio_channel_socket_get_local_address(ioc, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!addr) {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_basic_info(addr, info, errp);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_init_basic_info_from_remote_addr(QIOChannelSocket *ioc,
|
|
|
|
VncBasicInfo *info,
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SocketAddress *addr = NULL;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
addr = qio_channel_socket_get_remote_address(ioc, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!addr) {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_basic_info(addr, info, errp);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
static const char *vnc_auth_name(VncDisplay *vd) {
|
|
|
|
switch (vd->auth) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_INVALID:
|
|
|
|
return "invalid";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return "none";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VNC:
|
|
|
|
return "vnc";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_RA2:
|
|
|
|
return "ra2";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_RA2NE:
|
|
|
|
return "ra2ne";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
return "tight";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_ULTRA:
|
|
|
|
return "ultra";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_TLS:
|
|
|
|
return "tls";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT:
|
|
|
|
switch (vd->subauth) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_PLAIN:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+plain";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSNONE:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+none";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSVNC:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+vnc";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSPLAIN:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+plain";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+none";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+vnc";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+plain";
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+sasl";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+sasl";
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt";
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return "sasl";
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static VncServerInfo *vnc_server_info_get(VncDisplay *vd)
|
2010-01-14 17:50:53 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
VncServerInfo *info;
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2010-01-14 17:50:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
info = g_malloc(sizeof(*info));
|
qapi: Unbox base members
Rather than storing a base class as a pointer to a box, just
store the fields of that base class in the same order, so that
a child struct can be directly cast to its parent. This gives
less malloc overhead, less pointer dereferencing, and even less
generated code. Compare to the earlier commit 1e6c1616a "qapi:
Generate a nicer struct for flat unions" (although that patch
had fewer places to change, as less of qemu was directly using
qapi structs for flat unions). It also allows us to turn on
automatic type-safe wrappers for upcasting to the base class
of a struct.
Changes to the generated code look like this in qapi-types.h:
| struct SpiceChannel {
|- SpiceBasicInfo *base;
|+ /* Members inherited from SpiceBasicInfo: */
|+ char *host;
|+ char *port;
|+ NetworkAddressFamily family;
|+ /* Own members: */
| int64_t connection_id;
as well as additional upcast functions like qapi_SpiceChannel_base().
Meanwhile, changes to qapi-visit.c look like:
| static void visit_type_SpiceChannel_fields(Visitor *v, SpiceChannel **obj, Error **errp)
| {
| Error *err = NULL;
|
|- visit_type_implicit_SpiceBasicInfo(v, &(*obj)->base, &err);
|+ visit_type_SpiceBasicInfo_fields(v, (SpiceBasicInfo **)obj, &err);
| if (err) {
(the cast is necessary, since our upcast wrappers only deal with a
single pointer, not pointer-to-pointer); plus the wholesale
elimination of some now-unused visit_type_implicit_FOO() functions.
Without boxing, the corner case of one empty struct having
another empty struct as its base type now requires inserting a
dummy member (previously, the 'Base *base' member sufficed).
And now that we no longer consume a 'base' member in the generated
C struct, we can delete the former negative struct-base-clash-base
test.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1445898903-12082-11-git-send-email-eblake@redhat.com>
[Commit message tweaked slightly]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
2015-10-26 23:34:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_basic_info_from_server_addr(vd->lsock,
|
|
|
|
qapi_VncServerInfo_base(info), &err);
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
info->has_auth = true;
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
info->auth = g_strdup(vnc_auth_name(vd));
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncServerInfo(info);
|
|
|
|
info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return info;
|
2010-01-14 17:50:53 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_cache_auth(VncState *client)
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!client->info) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:32 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (client->tls) {
|
|
|
|
client->info->x509_dname =
|
|
|
|
qcrypto_tls_session_get_peer_name(client->tls);
|
|
|
|
client->info->has_x509_dname =
|
|
|
|
client->info->x509_dname != NULL;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:32 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (client->sasl.conn &&
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
client->sasl.username) {
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
client->info->has_sasl_username = true;
|
|
|
|
client->info->sasl_username = g_strdup(client->sasl.username);
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:32 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_cache_addr(VncState *client)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client->info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*client->info));
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_basic_info_from_remote_addr(client->sioc,
|
qapi: Unbox base members
Rather than storing a base class as a pointer to a box, just
store the fields of that base class in the same order, so that
a child struct can be directly cast to its parent. This gives
less malloc overhead, less pointer dereferencing, and even less
generated code. Compare to the earlier commit 1e6c1616a "qapi:
Generate a nicer struct for flat unions" (although that patch
had fewer places to change, as less of qemu was directly using
qapi structs for flat unions). It also allows us to turn on
automatic type-safe wrappers for upcasting to the base class
of a struct.
Changes to the generated code look like this in qapi-types.h:
| struct SpiceChannel {
|- SpiceBasicInfo *base;
|+ /* Members inherited from SpiceBasicInfo: */
|+ char *host;
|+ char *port;
|+ NetworkAddressFamily family;
|+ /* Own members: */
| int64_t connection_id;
as well as additional upcast functions like qapi_SpiceChannel_base().
Meanwhile, changes to qapi-visit.c look like:
| static void visit_type_SpiceChannel_fields(Visitor *v, SpiceChannel **obj, Error **errp)
| {
| Error *err = NULL;
|
|- visit_type_implicit_SpiceBasicInfo(v, &(*obj)->base, &err);
|+ visit_type_SpiceBasicInfo_fields(v, (SpiceBasicInfo **)obj, &err);
| if (err) {
(the cast is necessary, since our upcast wrappers only deal with a
single pointer, not pointer-to-pointer); plus the wholesale
elimination of some now-unused visit_type_implicit_FOO() functions.
Without boxing, the corner case of one empty struct having
another empty struct as its base type now requires inserting a
dummy member (previously, the 'Base *base' member sufficed).
And now that we no longer consume a 'base' member in the generated
C struct, we can delete the former negative struct-base-clash-base
test.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1445898903-12082-11-git-send-email-eblake@redhat.com>
[Commit message tweaked slightly]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
2015-10-26 23:34:49 +01:00
|
|
|
qapi_VncClientInfo_base(client->info),
|
2015-10-26 23:34:45 +01:00
|
|
|
&err);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncClientInfo(client->info);
|
|
|
|
client->info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_qmp_event(VncState *vs, QAPIEvent event)
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 17:50:57 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
VncServerInfo *si;
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 17:50:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->info) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
si = vnc_server_info_get(vs->vd);
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!si) {
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 17:50:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (event) {
|
|
|
|
case QAPI_EVENT_VNC_CONNECTED:
|
qapi: Unbox base members
Rather than storing a base class as a pointer to a box, just
store the fields of that base class in the same order, so that
a child struct can be directly cast to its parent. This gives
less malloc overhead, less pointer dereferencing, and even less
generated code. Compare to the earlier commit 1e6c1616a "qapi:
Generate a nicer struct for flat unions" (although that patch
had fewer places to change, as less of qemu was directly using
qapi structs for flat unions). It also allows us to turn on
automatic type-safe wrappers for upcasting to the base class
of a struct.
Changes to the generated code look like this in qapi-types.h:
| struct SpiceChannel {
|- SpiceBasicInfo *base;
|+ /* Members inherited from SpiceBasicInfo: */
|+ char *host;
|+ char *port;
|+ NetworkAddressFamily family;
|+ /* Own members: */
| int64_t connection_id;
as well as additional upcast functions like qapi_SpiceChannel_base().
Meanwhile, changes to qapi-visit.c look like:
| static void visit_type_SpiceChannel_fields(Visitor *v, SpiceChannel **obj, Error **errp)
| {
| Error *err = NULL;
|
|- visit_type_implicit_SpiceBasicInfo(v, &(*obj)->base, &err);
|+ visit_type_SpiceBasicInfo_fields(v, (SpiceBasicInfo **)obj, &err);
| if (err) {
(the cast is necessary, since our upcast wrappers only deal with a
single pointer, not pointer-to-pointer); plus the wholesale
elimination of some now-unused visit_type_implicit_FOO() functions.
Without boxing, the corner case of one empty struct having
another empty struct as its base type now requires inserting a
dummy member (previously, the 'Base *base' member sufficed).
And now that we no longer consume a 'base' member in the generated
C struct, we can delete the former negative struct-base-clash-base
test.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1445898903-12082-11-git-send-email-eblake@redhat.com>
[Commit message tweaked slightly]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
2015-10-26 23:34:49 +01:00
|
|
|
qapi_event_send_vnc_connected(si, qapi_VncClientInfo_base(vs->info),
|
|
|
|
&error_abort);
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QAPI_EVENT_VNC_INITIALIZED:
|
|
|
|
qapi_event_send_vnc_initialized(si, vs->info, &error_abort);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QAPI_EVENT_VNC_DISCONNECTED:
|
|
|
|
qapi_event_send_vnc_disconnected(si, vs->info, &error_abort);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 17:50:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncServerInfo(si);
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 17:50:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
static VncClientInfo *qmp_query_vnc_client(const VncState *client)
|
2007-02-05 21:20:30 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
VncClientInfo *info;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_basic_info_from_remote_addr(client->sioc,
|
|
|
|
qapi_VncClientInfo_base(info),
|
|
|
|
&err);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncClientInfo(info);
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
qapi: Unbox base members
Rather than storing a base class as a pointer to a box, just
store the fields of that base class in the same order, so that
a child struct can be directly cast to its parent. This gives
less malloc overhead, less pointer dereferencing, and even less
generated code. Compare to the earlier commit 1e6c1616a "qapi:
Generate a nicer struct for flat unions" (although that patch
had fewer places to change, as less of qemu was directly using
qapi structs for flat unions). It also allows us to turn on
automatic type-safe wrappers for upcasting to the base class
of a struct.
Changes to the generated code look like this in qapi-types.h:
| struct SpiceChannel {
|- SpiceBasicInfo *base;
|+ /* Members inherited from SpiceBasicInfo: */
|+ char *host;
|+ char *port;
|+ NetworkAddressFamily family;
|+ /* Own members: */
| int64_t connection_id;
as well as additional upcast functions like qapi_SpiceChannel_base().
Meanwhile, changes to qapi-visit.c look like:
| static void visit_type_SpiceChannel_fields(Visitor *v, SpiceChannel **obj, Error **errp)
| {
| Error *err = NULL;
|
|- visit_type_implicit_SpiceBasicInfo(v, &(*obj)->base, &err);
|+ visit_type_SpiceBasicInfo_fields(v, (SpiceBasicInfo **)obj, &err);
| if (err) {
(the cast is necessary, since our upcast wrappers only deal with a
single pointer, not pointer-to-pointer); plus the wholesale
elimination of some now-unused visit_type_implicit_FOO() functions.
Without boxing, the corner case of one empty struct having
another empty struct as its base type now requires inserting a
dummy member (previously, the 'Base *base' member sufficed).
And now that we no longer consume a 'base' member in the generated
C struct, we can delete the former negative struct-base-clash-base
test.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1445898903-12082-11-git-send-email-eblake@redhat.com>
[Commit message tweaked slightly]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
2015-10-26 23:34:49 +01:00
|
|
|
info->websocket = client->websocket;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (client->tls) {
|
|
|
|
info->x509_dname = qcrypto_tls_session_get_peer_name(client->tls);
|
|
|
|
info->has_x509_dname = info->x509_dname != NULL;
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
if (client->sasl.conn && client->sasl.username) {
|
|
|
|
info->has_sasl_username = true;
|
|
|
|
info->sasl_username = g_strdup(client->sasl.username);
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
return info;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
static VncDisplay *vnc_display_find(const char *id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (id == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return QTAILQ_FIRST(&vnc_displays);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vd, &vnc_displays, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(id, vd->id) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return vd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-09 15:27:39 +01:00
|
|
|
static VncClientInfoList *qmp_query_client_list(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncClientInfoList *cinfo, *prev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
VncState *client;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(client, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
cinfo = g_new0(VncClientInfoList, 1);
|
|
|
|
cinfo->value = qmp_query_vnc_client(client);
|
|
|
|
cinfo->next = prev;
|
|
|
|
prev = cinfo;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
VncInfo *qmp_query_vnc(Error **errp)
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
VncInfo *info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vnc_display_find(NULL);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SocketAddress *addr = NULL;
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-19 10:46:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vd == NULL || !vd->enabled) {
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
info->enabled = false;
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
info->enabled = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* for compatibility with the original command */
|
|
|
|
info->has_clients = true;
|
2014-12-09 15:27:39 +01:00
|
|
|
info->clients = qmp_query_client_list(vd);
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vd->lsock == NULL) {
|
vnc: fix "info vnc" with "-vnc ..., reverse=on"
When reverse connection is in use, there is no active VNC server
socket. Because of this, getsockopt(-1, ...) is attempted and
the following error is emitted:
$ socat TCP-LISTEN:5900,reuseaddr TCP-LISTEN:5901,reuseaddr &
$ x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -vnc localhost:5900,reverse -monitor stdio
QEMU 1.2.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
(qemu) info vnc
An undefined error has occurred
Because however the host, family, service and auth fields are
optional, we can just exit if there is no active server socket.
$ x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -vnc localhost:5900,reverse -monitor stdio
QEMU 1.2.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
(qemu) info vnc
Server:
Client:
address: 127.0.0.1:5900
x509_dname: none
username: none
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2012-10-10 14:30:58 +02:00
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
addr = qio_channel_socket_get_local_address(vd->lsock, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!addr) {
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 20:16:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (addr->type) {
|
|
|
|
case SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_INET:
|
|
|
|
info->host = g_strdup(addr->u.inet->host);
|
|
|
|
info->service = g_strdup(addr->u.inet->port);
|
|
|
|
if (addr->u.inet->ipv6) {
|
|
|
|
info->family = NETWORK_ADDRESS_FAMILY_IPV6;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
info->family = NETWORK_ADDRESS_FAMILY_IPV4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_UNIX:
|
|
|
|
info->host = g_strdup("");
|
|
|
|
info->service = g_strdup(addr->u.q_unix->path);
|
|
|
|
info->family = NETWORK_ADDRESS_FAMILY_UNIX;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported socket kind %d",
|
|
|
|
addr->type);
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->has_host = true;
|
|
|
|
info->has_service = true;
|
|
|
|
info->has_family = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->has_auth = true;
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
info->auth = g_strdup(vnc_auth_name(vd));
|
2007-02-05 21:20:30 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_error:
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
2011-10-17 20:41:22 +02:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncInfo(info);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2007-02-05 21:20:30 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static VncBasicInfoList *qmp_query_server_entry(QIOChannelSocket *ioc,
|
2014-12-10 09:49:39 +01:00
|
|
|
bool websocket,
|
2014-12-17 15:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
VncBasicInfoList *prev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncBasicInfoList *list;
|
|
|
|
VncBasicInfo *info;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
SocketAddress *addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addr = qio_channel_socket_get_local_address(ioc, &err);
|
|
|
|
if (!addr) {
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
2014-12-17 15:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
return prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info = g_new0(VncBasicInfo, 1);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_basic_info(addr, info, &err);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncBasicInfo(info);
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
|
|
|
return prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-10 09:49:39 +01:00
|
|
|
info->websocket = websocket;
|
2014-12-17 15:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list = g_new0(VncBasicInfoList, 1);
|
|
|
|
list->value = info;
|
|
|
|
list->next = prev;
|
|
|
|
return list;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void qmp_query_auth(VncDisplay *vd, VncInfo2 *info)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (vd->auth) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VNC:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_VNC;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_RA2:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_RA2;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_RA2NE:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_RA2NE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_TIGHT;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_ULTRA:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_ULTRA;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_TLS:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_TLS;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
|
|
|
info->has_vencrypt = true;
|
|
|
|
switch (vd->subauth) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_PLAIN:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_PLAIN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSNONE:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_TLS_NONE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSVNC:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_TLS_VNC;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSPLAIN:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_TLS_PLAIN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_X509_NONE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_X509_VNC;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_X509_PLAIN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_TLS_SASL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL:
|
|
|
|
info->vencrypt = VNC_VENCRYPT_SUB_AUTH_X509_SASL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
info->has_vencrypt = false;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_SASL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_NONE:
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
info->auth = VNC_PRIMARY_AUTH_NONE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VncInfo2List *qmp_query_vnc_servers(Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncInfo2List *item, *prev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
VncInfo2 *info;
|
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd;
|
|
|
|
DeviceState *dev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vd, &vnc_displays, next) {
|
|
|
|
info = g_new0(VncInfo2, 1);
|
|
|
|
info->id = g_strdup(vd->id);
|
|
|
|
info->clients = qmp_query_client_list(vd);
|
|
|
|
qmp_query_auth(vd, info);
|
|
|
|
if (vd->dcl.con) {
|
|
|
|
dev = DEVICE(object_property_get_link(OBJECT(vd->dcl.con),
|
|
|
|
"device", NULL));
|
|
|
|
info->has_display = true;
|
|
|
|
info->display = g_strdup(dev->id);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vd->lsock != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
info->server = qmp_query_server_entry(
|
|
|
|
vd->lsock, false, info->server);
|
2014-12-17 15:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vd->lwebsock != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
info->server = qmp_query_server_entry(
|
|
|
|
vd->lwebsock, true, info->server);
|
2014-12-17 15:49:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = g_new0(VncInfo2List, 1);
|
|
|
|
item->value = info;
|
|
|
|
item->next = prev;
|
|
|
|
prev = item;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
/* TODO
|
|
|
|
1) Get the queue working for IO.
|
|
|
|
2) there is some weirdness when using the -S option (the screen is grey
|
|
|
|
and not totally invalidated
|
|
|
|
3) resolutions > 1024
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-06 13:54:28 +01:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync);
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
|
|
|
|
int x_position, int y_position,
|
|
|
|
int w, int h);
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd);
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-30 12:10:06 +01:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_width(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return MIN(VNC_MAX_WIDTH, ROUND_UP(surface_width(vd->ds),
|
|
|
|
VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_height(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return MIN(VNC_MAX_HEIGHT, surface_height(vd->ds));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_set_area_dirty(DECLARE_BITMAP(dirty[VNC_MAX_HEIGHT],
|
|
|
|
VNC_MAX_WIDTH / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT),
|
2015-10-30 12:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd,
|
|
|
|
int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int width = vnc_width(vd);
|
|
|
|
int height = vnc_height(vd);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-01-08 10:08:37 +01:00
|
|
|
/* this is needed this to ensure we updated all affected
|
|
|
|
* blocks if x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT != 0 */
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
w += (x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
|
|
|
|
x -= (x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
|
2007-12-11 23:31:32 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
x = MIN(x, width);
|
|
|
|
y = MIN(y, height);
|
|
|
|
w = MIN(x + w, width) - x;
|
2014-01-08 10:08:37 +01:00
|
|
|
h = MIN(y + h, height);
|
2008-05-20 02:07:58 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
for (; y < h; y++) {
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
bitmap_set(dirty[y], x / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT,
|
2014-01-08 10:08:37 +01:00
|
|
|
DIV_ROUND_UP(w, VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_update(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
|
|
|
struct VncSurface *s = &vd->guest;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-30 12:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_area_dirty(s->dirty, vd, x, y, w, h);
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-03 14:31:34 +02:00
|
|
|
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
|
|
|
|
int32_t encoding)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 11:04:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-25 18:25:16 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc == NULL || !vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE)) {
|
2010-05-25 18:25:16 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->client_width == pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server) &&
|
|
|
|
vs->client_height == pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server)) {
|
2010-05-25 18:25:20 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->client_width = pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_height = pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-25 18:25:16 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
|
2010-05-25 18:25:18 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->client_width, vs->client_height,
|
2010-05-25 18:25:16 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-25 18:25:16 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_abort_display_jobs(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
vs->abort = true;
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
vs->abort = false;
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
int vnc_server_fb_stride(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return pixman_image_get_stride(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *vnc_server_fb_ptr(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
ptr += y * vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
|
|
|
ptr += x * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
|
|
|
return ptr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-30 12:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_update_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_image_unref(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
vd->server = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-30 12:10:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vd->clients)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-30 12:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
vd->server = pixman_image_create_bits(VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT,
|
|
|
|
vnc_width(vd),
|
|
|
|
vnc_height(vd),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 15:03:04 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_switch(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
DisplaySurface *surface)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 11:34:31 +01:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
int width, height;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_abort_display_jobs(vd);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
vd->ds = surface;
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* server surface */
|
2015-10-30 12:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_update_server_surface(vd);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-20 16:59:14 +01:00
|
|
|
/* guest surface */
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_image_unref(vd->guest.fb);
|
2013-02-28 17:16:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vd->guest.fb = pixman_image_ref(surface->image);
|
|
|
|
vd->guest.format = surface->format;
|
2015-10-30 12:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
width = vnc_width(vd);
|
|
|
|
height = vnc_height(vd);
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
memset(vd->guest.dirty, 0x00, sizeof(vd->guest.dirty));
|
2015-10-30 12:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_area_dirty(vd->guest.dirty, vd, 0, 0,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
width, height);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_colordepth(vs);
|
2010-05-25 18:25:20 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_desktop_resize(vs);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->cursor) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
memset(vs->dirty, 0x00, sizeof(vs->dirty));
|
2015-10-30 12:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_area_dirty(vs->dirty, vd, 0, 0,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
width, height);
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* fastest code */
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_write_pixels_copy(VncState *vs,
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
void *pixels, int size)
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, pixels, size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* slowest but generic code. */
|
2010-05-03 14:31:34 +02:00
|
|
|
void vnc_convert_pixel(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, uint32_t v)
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
uint8_t r, g, b;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
#if VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT == PIXMAN_FORMAT(32, PIXMAN_TYPE_ARGB, 0, 8, 8, 8)
|
|
|
|
r = (((v & 0x00ff0000) >> 16) << vs->client_pf.rbits) >> 8;
|
|
|
|
g = (((v & 0x0000ff00) >> 8) << vs->client_pf.gbits) >> 8;
|
|
|
|
b = (((v & 0x000000ff) >> 0) << vs->client_pf.bbits) >> 8;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
# error need some bits here if you change VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
v = (r << vs->client_pf.rshift) |
|
|
|
|
(g << vs->client_pf.gshift) |
|
|
|
|
(b << vs->client_pf.bshift);
|
|
|
|
switch (vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = v;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->client_be) {
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
buf[0] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->client_be) {
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
buf[0] = v >> 24;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[3] = v;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
buf[3] = v >> 24;
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_write_pixels_generic(VncState *vs,
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
void *pixels1, int size)
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[4];
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES == 4) {
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
uint32_t *pixels = pixels1;
|
|
|
|
int n, i;
|
|
|
|
n = size >> 2;
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_convert_pixel(vs, buf, pixels[i]);
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel);
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
int vnc_raw_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *row;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, x, y);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels(vs, row, w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
row += vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
int vnc_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
int n = 0;
|
2015-08-27 14:46:25 +02:00
|
|
|
bool encode_raw = false;
|
|
|
|
size_t saved_offs = vs->output.offset;
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-02 16:58:43 +01:00
|
|
|
switch(vs->vnc_encoding) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZLIB:
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
n = vnc_zlib_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_HEXTILE:
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_HEXTILE);
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
n = vnc_hextile_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-19 09:24:10 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_tight_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-07-07 20:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_tight_png_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-02-04 09:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZRLE:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_zrle_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZYWRLE:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_zywrle_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2015-08-27 14:46:25 +02:00
|
|
|
encode_raw = true;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-27 14:46:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the client has the same pixel format as our internal buffer and
|
|
|
|
* a RAW encoding would need less space fall back to RAW encoding to
|
|
|
|
* save bandwidth and processing power in the client. */
|
|
|
|
if (!encode_raw && vs->write_pixels == vnc_write_pixels_copy &&
|
|
|
|
12 + h * w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES <= (vs->output.offset - saved_offs)) {
|
|
|
|
vs->output.offset = saved_offs;
|
|
|
|
encode_raw = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (encode_raw) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_RAW);
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_raw_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 09:24:09 +02:00
|
|
|
return n;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_copy(VncState *vs, int src_x, int src_y, int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-07-27 17:10:48 +02:00
|
|
|
/* send bitblit op to the vnc client */
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, dst_x, dst_y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_COPYRECT);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, src_x);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, src_y);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 14:51:41 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_copy(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
int src_x, int src_y,
|
|
|
|
int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 11:34:31 +01:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs, *vn;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *src_row;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *dst_row;
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
int i, x, y, pitch, inc, w_lim, s;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
int cmp_bytes;
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-25 08:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vd->server) {
|
|
|
|
/* no client connected */
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
|
|
|
|
vs->force_update = 1;
|
2014-03-06 13:54:28 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_update_client(vs, 1, true);
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
/* vs might be free()ed here */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* do bitblit op on the local surface too */
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
pitch = vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
|
|
|
src_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, src_x, src_y);
|
|
|
|
dst_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, dst_x, dst_y);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
y = dst_y;
|
|
|
|
inc = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (dst_y > src_y) {
|
|
|
|
/* copy backwards */
|
|
|
|
src_row += pitch * (h-1);
|
|
|
|
dst_row += pitch * (h-1);
|
|
|
|
pitch = -pitch;
|
|
|
|
y = dst_y + h - 1;
|
|
|
|
inc = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
w_lim = w - (VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT - (dst_x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
|
|
|
|
if (w_lim < 0) {
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
w_lim = w;
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
w_lim = w - (w_lim % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
|
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x <= w_lim;
|
|
|
|
x += s, src_row += cmp_bytes, dst_row += cmp_bytes) {
|
|
|
|
if (x == w_lim) {
|
|
|
|
if ((s = w - w_lim) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!x) {
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
s = (VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT -
|
|
|
|
(dst_x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
s = MIN(s, w_lim);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
s = VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
cmp_bytes = s * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(src_row, dst_row, cmp_bytes) == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
memmove(dst_row, src_row, cmp_bytes);
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
set_bit(((x + dst_x) / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT),
|
|
|
|
vs->dirty[y]);
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
src_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
|
|
|
dst_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
y += inc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_copy(vs, src_x, src_y, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 14:51:41 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_mouse_set(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
int x, int y, int visible)
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* can we ask the client(s) to move the pointer ??? */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_cursor_define(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
QEMUCursor *c = vs->vd->cursor;
|
|
|
|
int isize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RICH_CURSOR)) {
|
2010-07-07 20:58:03 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* padding */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* # of rects */
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, c->hot_x, c->hot_y, c->width, c->height,
|
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_RICH_CURSOR);
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
isize = c->width * c->height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_pixels_generic(vs, c->data, isize);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, vs->vd->cursor_mask, vs->vd->cursor_msize);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:03 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 14:51:41 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_cursor_define(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
QEMUCursor *c)
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cursor_put(vd->cursor);
|
2011-08-21 05:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
g_free(vd->cursor_mask);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vd->cursor = c;
|
|
|
|
cursor_get(vd->cursor);
|
|
|
|
vd->cursor_msize = cursor_get_mono_bpl(c) * c->height;
|
2011-08-21 05:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
vd->cursor_mask = g_malloc0(vd->cursor_msize);
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
cursor_get_mono_mask(c, 0, vd->cursor_mask);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 20:04:12 +02:00
|
|
|
static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(VncState *vs,
|
2011-02-04 09:06:06 +01:00
|
|
|
int y, int last_x, int x, int height)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int h;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:06:06 +01:00
|
|
|
for (h = 1; h < (height - y); h++) {
|
2011-02-04 09:06:05 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(last_x, vs->dirty[y + h])) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-02-04 09:06:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-08 10:08:36 +01:00
|
|
|
bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y + h], last_x, x - last_x);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return h;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-06 13:54:28 +01:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-23 11:52:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->need_update && vs->ioc != NULL) {
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
VncJob *job;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
int y;
|
2014-03-17 18:38:58 +01:00
|
|
|
int height, width;
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
int n = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
|
2009-03-20 16:59:24 +01:00
|
|
|
/* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2008-01-14 00:51:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-23 11:52:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-20 16:59:14 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Send screen updates to the vnc client using the server
|
|
|
|
* surface and server dirty map. guest surface updates
|
|
|
|
* happening in parallel don't disturb us, the next pass will
|
|
|
|
* send them to the client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
job = vnc_job_new(vs);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
|
2010-05-25 18:25:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
y = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
int x, h;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long x2;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long offset = find_next_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty,
|
|
|
|
height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs),
|
|
|
|
y * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs));
|
|
|
|
if (offset == height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs)) {
|
|
|
|
/* no more dirty bits */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
y = offset / VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
|
|
|
|
x = offset % VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
|
|
|
|
x2 = find_next_zero_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty[y],
|
|
|
|
VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs), x);
|
|
|
|
bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y], x, x2 - x);
|
|
|
|
h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, x, x2, height);
|
2014-03-17 18:38:58 +01:00
|
|
|
x2 = MIN(x2, width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
|
|
|
|
if (x2 > x) {
|
|
|
|
n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, x * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, y,
|
|
|
|
(x2 - x) * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, h);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-02 16:25:34 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!x && x2 == width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT) {
|
|
|
|
y += h;
|
|
|
|
if (y == height) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_job_push(job);
|
2014-06-13 10:23:10 +02:00
|
|
|
if (sync) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-20 16:59:24 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->force_update = 0;
|
2014-07-23 11:52:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->has_dirty = 0;
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return n;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->disconnecting) {
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
|
2014-03-06 13:54:28 +01:00
|
|
|
} else if (sync) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
/* audio */
|
|
|
|
static void audio_capture_notify(void *opaque, audcnotification_e cmd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case AUD_CNOTIFY_DISABLE:
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_END);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUD_CNOTIFY_ENABLE:
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_BEGIN);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_capture_destroy(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_capture(void *opaque, void *buf, int size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_DATA);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_add(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audio_capture_ops ops;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->audio_cap) {
|
2014-03-22 00:42:21 +01:00
|
|
|
error_report("audio already running");
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ops.notify = audio_capture_notify;
|
|
|
|
ops.destroy = audio_capture_destroy;
|
|
|
|
ops.capture = audio_capture;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-14 01:11:35 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->audio_cap = AUD_add_capture(&vs->as, &ops, vs);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->audio_cap) {
|
2014-03-22 00:42:21 +01:00
|
|
|
error_report("Failed to add audio capture");
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_del(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (vs->audio_cap) {
|
|
|
|
AUD_del_capture(vs->audio_cap, vs);
|
|
|
|
vs->audio_cap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->disconnecting) {
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, VNC_SHARE_MODE_DISCONNECTED);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc_tag) {
|
|
|
|
g_source_remove(vs->ioc_tag);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
qio_channel_close(vs->ioc, NULL);
|
|
|
|
vs->disconnecting = TRUE;
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_disconnect_finish(VncState *vs)
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs); /* Wait encoding jobs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_qmp_event(vs, QAPI_EVENT_VNC_DISCONNECTED);
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_DISCONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client disconnects from QEMU, client's
information such as port and IP address are provided.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_DISCONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1", "sasl_username": "foo" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 17:50:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 09:24:07 +02:00
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->input);
|
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->output);
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncClientInfo(vs->info);
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 09:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_zlib_clear(vs);
|
2010-05-19 09:24:10 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_tight_clear(vs);
|
2011-02-04 09:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_zrle_clear(vs);
|
2010-05-19 09:24:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(vs);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
|
|
|
audio_del(vs);
|
2012-02-08 13:18:37 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_release_modifiers(vs);
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 11:04:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->initialized) {
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&vs->vd->clients, vs, next);
|
|
|
|
qemu_remove_mouse_mode_change_notifier(&vs->mouse_mode_notifier);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vs->vd->clients)) {
|
|
|
|
/* last client gone */
|
|
|
|
vnc_update_server_surface(vs->vd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-21 11:04:45 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-03-10 17:12:02 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->lock_key_sync)
|
|
|
|
qemu_remove_led_event_handler(vs->led);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qemu_mutex_destroy(&vs->output_mutex);
|
2013-01-21 11:04:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->bh != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_bh_delete(vs->bh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-14 07:58:47 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->jobs_buffer);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < VNC_STAT_ROWS; ++i) {
|
2011-08-21 05:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->lossy_rect[i]);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-21 05:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->lossy_rect);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(vs->ioc));
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(vs->sioc));
|
|
|
|
vs->sioc = NULL;
|
2011-08-21 05:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs);
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
ssize_t vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, ssize_t ret, Error **errp)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Closing down client sock: EOF\n");
|
|
|
|
} else if (ret != QIO_CHANNEL_ERR_BLOCK) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Closing down client sock: ret %d (%s)\n",
|
|
|
|
ret, errp ? error_get_pretty(*errp) : "Unknown");
|
2008-04-25 01:40:55 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (errp) {
|
|
|
|
error_free(*errp);
|
|
|
|
*errp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vnc_client_error(VncState *vs)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Closing down client sock: protocol error\n");
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to write a chunk of data to the client socket. The data may
|
|
|
|
* be the raw data, or may have already been encoded by SASL.
|
|
|
|
* The data will be written either straight onto the socket, or
|
|
|
|
* written via the GNUTLS wrappers, if TLS/SSL encryption is enabled
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB, it is theoretically possible to have 2 layers of encryption,
|
|
|
|
* both SASL, and this TLS layer. It is highly unlikely in practice
|
|
|
|
* though, since SASL encryption will typically be a no-op if TLS
|
|
|
|
* is active
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
|
|
|
|
* the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
|
|
|
|
* -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
2015-03-02 20:01:05 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = qio_channel_write(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, (const char *)data, datalen, &err);
|
2009-03-20 16:59:18 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Wrote wire %p %zd -> %ld\n", data, datalen, ret);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, &err);
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to write buffered data to the client socket, when not
|
|
|
|
* using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will write as much data
|
|
|
|
* as possible without blocking. If all buffered data is written,
|
|
|
|
* will switch the FD poll() handler back to read monitoring.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
|
|
|
|
* the buffered output data if the socket would block. Returns
|
|
|
|
* -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
2009-03-20 16:59:18 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Write Plain: Pending output %p size %zd offset %zd. Wait SSF %d\n",
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->output.buffer, vs->output.capacity, vs->output.offset,
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->sasl.conn &&
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.runSSF &&
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF) {
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs, vs->output.buffer, vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF -= ret;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs, vs->output.buffer, vs->output.offset);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 11:04:43 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_advance(&vs->output, ret);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc_tag) {
|
|
|
|
g_source_remove(vs->ioc_tag);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, G_IO_IN, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First function called whenever there is data to be written to
|
|
|
|
* the client socket. Will delegate actual work according to whether
|
|
|
|
* SASL SSF layers are enabled (thus requiring encryption calls)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_write_locked(VncState *vs)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (vs->sasl.conn &&
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.runSSF &&
|
2010-04-25 20:35:52 +02:00
|
|
|
!vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_sasl(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-11 16:53:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_plain(vs);
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_write(VncState *vs)
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2015-03-11 16:53:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset) {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_locked(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else if (vs->ioc != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc_tag) {
|
|
|
|
g_source_remove(vs->ioc_tag);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, G_IO_IN, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_read_when(VncState *vs, VncReadEvent *func, size_t expecting)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vs->read_handler = func;
|
|
|
|
vs->read_handler_expect = expecting;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to read a chunk of data from the client socket. The data may
|
|
|
|
* be the raw data, or may need to be further decoded by SASL.
|
|
|
|
* The data will be read either straight from to the socket, or
|
|
|
|
* read via the GNUTLS wrappers, if TLS/SSL encryption is enabled
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB, it is theoretically possible to have 2 layers of encryption,
|
|
|
|
* both SASL, and this TLS layer. It is highly unlikely in practice
|
|
|
|
* though, since SASL encryption will typically be a no-op if TLS
|
|
|
|
* is active
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes read, which may be less than
|
|
|
|
* the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
|
|
|
|
* -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2015-03-02 20:01:05 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = qio_channel_read(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, (char *)data, datalen, &err);
|
2009-03-20 16:59:18 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Read wire %p %zd -> %ld\n", data, datalen, ret);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, &err);
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to read data from the client socket to the input buffer,
|
|
|
|
* when not using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will read as much
|
|
|
|
* data as possible without blocking.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes read. Returns -1 on error, and
|
|
|
|
* disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t vnc_client_read_plain(VncState *vs)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
2009-03-20 16:59:18 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Read plain %p size %zd offset %zd\n",
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->input.buffer, vs->input.capacity, vs->input.offset);
|
|
|
|
buffer_reserve(&vs->input, 4096);
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_buf(vs, buffer_end(&vs->input), 4096);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->input.offset += ret;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-14 07:58:47 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_jobs_bh(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_consume_buffer(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First function called whenever there is more data to be read from
|
|
|
|
* the client socket. Will delegate actual work according to whether
|
|
|
|
* SASL SSF layers are enabled (thus requiring decryption calls)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_read(VncState *vs)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-06 16:35:55 +02:00
|
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (vs->sasl.conn && vs->sasl.runSSF)
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_sasl(vs);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
2015-03-11 16:53:49 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_plain(vs);
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->disconnecting) {
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (vs->read_handler && vs->input.offset >= vs->read_handler_expect) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t len = vs->read_handler_expect;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = vs->read_handler(vs, vs->input.buffer, len);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->disconnecting) {
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
2013-01-21 11:04:43 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_advance(&vs->input, len);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->read_handler_expect = ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc G_GNUC_UNUSED,
|
|
|
|
GIOCondition condition, void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
if (condition & G_IO_IN) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_read(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (condition & G_IO_OUT) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_write(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
buffer_reserve(&vs->output, len);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc != NULL && buffer_empty(&vs->output)) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc_tag) {
|
|
|
|
g_source_remove(vs->ioc_tag);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, G_IO_IN | G_IO_OUT, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buffer_append(&vs->output, data, len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_s32(VncState *vs, int32_t value)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, *(uint32_t *)&value);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_u32(VncState *vs, uint32_t value)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[4];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = (value >> 24) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = (value >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = (value >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[3] = value & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, 4);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_u16(VncState *vs, uint16_t value)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[2];
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = (value >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = value & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, 2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_u8(VncState *vs, uint8_t value)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, (char *)&value, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_flush(VncState *vs)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2015-03-11 16:53:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ioc != NULL && vs->output.offset) {
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_locked(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 12:04:48 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint8_t read_u8(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return data[offset];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 12:04:48 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint16_t read_u16(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return ((data[offset] & 0xFF) << 8) | (data[offset + 1] & 0xFF);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 12:04:48 +01:00
|
|
|
static int32_t read_s32(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (int32_t)((data[offset] << 24) | (data[offset + 1] << 16) |
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
(data[offset + 2] << 8) | data[offset + 3]);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
uint32_t read_u32(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return ((data[offset] << 24) | (data[offset + 1] << 16) |
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
(data[offset + 2] << 8) | data[offset + 3]);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
static void client_cut_text(VncState *vs, size_t len, uint8_t *text)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-20 14:06:26 +02:00
|
|
|
static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
|
2007-02-05 21:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-03-10 16:38:29 +01:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
|
2010-03-10 16:38:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2007-02-05 21:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->absolute = absolute;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
static void pointer_event(VncState *vs, int button_mask, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
qapi: Don't let implicit enum MAX member collide
Now that we guarantee the user doesn't have any enum values
beginning with a single underscore, we can use that for our
own purposes. Renaming ENUM_MAX to ENUM__MAX makes it obvious
that the sentinel is generated.
This patch was mostly generated by applying a temporary patch:
|diff --git a/scripts/qapi.py b/scripts/qapi.py
|index e6d014b..b862ec9 100644
|--- a/scripts/qapi.py
|+++ b/scripts/qapi.py
|@@ -1570,6 +1570,7 @@ const char *const %(c_name)s_lookup[] = {
| max_index = c_enum_const(name, 'MAX', prefix)
| ret += mcgen('''
| [%(max_index)s] = NULL,
|+// %(max_index)s
| };
| ''',
| max_index=max_index)
then running:
$ cat qapi-{types,event}.c tests/test-qapi-types.c |
sed -n 's,^// \(.*\)MAX,s|\1MAX|\1_MAX|g,p' > list
$ git grep -l _MAX | xargs sed -i -f list
The only things not generated are the changes in scripts/qapi.py.
Rejecting enum members named 'MAX' is now useless, and will be dropped
in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1447836791-369-23-git-send-email-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
[Rebased to current master, commit message tweaked]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
2015-11-18 09:52:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint32_t bmap[INPUT_BUTTON__MAX] = {
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
[INPUT_BUTTON_LEFT] = 0x01,
|
|
|
|
[INPUT_BUTTON_MIDDLE] = 0x02,
|
|
|
|
[INPUT_BUTTON_RIGHT] = 0x04,
|
qapi: Change munging of CamelCase enum values
When munging enum values, the fact that we were passing the entire
prefix + value through camel_to_upper() meant that enum values
spelled with CamelCase could be turned into CAMEL_CASE. However,
this provides a potential collision (both OneTwo and One-Two would
munge into ONE_TWO) for enum types, when the same two names are
valid side-by-side as QAPI member names. By changing the generation
of enum constants to always be prefix + '_' + c_name(value,
False).upper(), and ensuring that there are no case collisions (in
the next patches), we no longer have to worry about names that
would be distinct as QAPI members but collide as variant tag names,
without having to think about what munging the heuristics in
camel_to_upper() will actually perform on an enum value.
Making the change will affect enums that did not follow coding
conventions, using 'CamelCase' rather than desired 'lower-case'.
Thankfully, there are only two culprits: InputButton and ErrorClass.
We already tweaked ErrorClass to make it an alias of QapiErrorClass,
where only the alias needs changing rather than the whole tree. So
the bulk of this change is modifying INPUT_BUTTON_WHEEL_UP to the
new INPUT_BUTTON_WHEELUP (and likewise for WHEELDOWN). That part
of this commit may later need reverting if we rename the enum
constants from 'WheelUp' to 'wheel-up' as part of moving
x-input-send-event to a stable interface; but at least we have
documentation bread crumbs in place to remind us (commit 513e7cd),
and it matches the fact that SDL constants are also spelled
SDL_BUTTON_WHEELUP.
Suggested by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1447836791-369-27-git-send-email-eblake@redhat.com>
[Commit message tweaked]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
2015-11-18 09:53:01 +01:00
|
|
|
[INPUT_BUTTON_WHEELUP] = 0x08,
|
|
|
|
[INPUT_BUTTON_WHEELDOWN] = 0x10,
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
QemuConsole *con = vs->vd->dcl.con;
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
int width = pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server);
|
|
|
|
int height = pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->last_bmask != button_mask) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_input_update_buttons(con, bmap, vs->last_bmask, button_mask);
|
|
|
|
vs->last_bmask = button_mask;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-05 21:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->absolute) {
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_queue_abs(con, INPUT_AXIS_X, x, width);
|
|
|
|
qemu_input_queue_abs(con, INPUT_AXIS_Y, y, height);
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
} else if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE)) {
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_queue_rel(con, INPUT_AXIS_X, x - 0x7FFF);
|
|
|
|
qemu_input_queue_rel(con, INPUT_AXIS_Y, y - 0x7FFF);
|
2007-02-05 21:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->last_x != -1) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_input_queue_rel(con, INPUT_AXIS_X, x - vs->last_x);
|
|
|
|
qemu_input_queue_rel(con, INPUT_AXIS_Y, y - vs->last_y);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->last_x = x;
|
|
|
|
vs->last_y = y;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-12-02 15:17:45 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_sync();
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
static void reset_keys(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[i]) {
|
2013-12-02 14:27:18 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_number(vs->vd->dcl.con, i, false);
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
static void press_key(VncState *vs, int keysym)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-02-28 21:03:00 +01:00
|
|
|
int keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->vd->kbd_layout, keysym) & SCANCODE_KEYMASK;
|
2013-12-02 14:27:18 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_number(vs->vd->dcl.con, keycode, true);
|
2014-06-02 13:15:05 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_delay(0);
|
2013-12-02 14:27:18 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_number(vs->vd->dcl.con, keycode, false);
|
2014-06-02 13:15:05 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_delay(0);
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-25 07:29:10 +02:00
|
|
|
static int current_led_state(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ledstate = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x46]) {
|
|
|
|
ledstate |= QEMU_SCROLL_LOCK_LED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x45]) {
|
|
|
|
ledstate |= QEMU_NUM_LOCK_LED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x3a]) {
|
|
|
|
ledstate |= QEMU_CAPS_LOCK_LED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ledstate;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_led_state_change(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ledstate = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_LED_STATE)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ledstate = current_led_state(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, 1, 1, VNC_ENCODING_LED_STATE);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, ledstate);
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-26 17:17:39 +01:00
|
|
|
static void kbd_leds(void *opaque, int ledstate)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
2013-04-25 07:29:09 +02:00
|
|
|
int caps, num, scr;
|
2013-05-15 10:20:40 +02:00
|
|
|
bool has_changed = (ledstate != current_led_state(vs));
|
2010-02-26 17:17:39 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_guest_leds((ledstate & QEMU_CAPS_LOCK_LED),
|
|
|
|
(ledstate & QEMU_NUM_LOCK_LED),
|
|
|
|
(ledstate & QEMU_SCROLL_LOCK_LED));
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-26 17:17:39 +01:00
|
|
|
caps = ledstate & QEMU_CAPS_LOCK_LED ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
num = ledstate & QEMU_NUM_LOCK_LED ? 1 : 0;
|
2013-04-25 07:29:09 +02:00
|
|
|
scr = ledstate & QEMU_SCROLL_LOCK_LED ? 1 : 0;
|
2010-02-26 17:17:39 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] != caps) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] = caps;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x45] != num) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-25 07:29:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x46] != scr) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x46] = scr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-04-25 07:29:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Sending the current led state message to the client */
|
2013-05-15 10:20:40 +02:00
|
|
|
if (has_changed) {
|
2013-04-25 07:29:10 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_led_state_change(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-02-26 17:17:39 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* QEMU console switch */
|
|
|
|
switch(keycode) {
|
|
|
|
case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x36: /* Right Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x1d: /* Left CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x9d: /* Right CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x38: /* Left ALT */
|
|
|
|
case 0xb8: /* Right ALT */
|
|
|
|
if (down)
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[keycode] = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[keycode] = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-09-16 23:08:06 +02:00
|
|
|
case 0x02 ... 0x0a: /* '1' to '9' keys */
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->dcl.con == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
down && vs->modifiers_state[0x1d] && vs->modifiers_state[0x38]) {
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Reset the modifiers sent to the current console */
|
|
|
|
reset_keys(vs);
|
|
|
|
console_select(keycode - 0x02);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
case 0x3a: /* CapsLock */
|
|
|
|
case 0x45: /* NumLock */
|
2010-02-26 17:17:39 +01:00
|
|
|
if (down)
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[keycode] ^= 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-25 07:29:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Turn off the lock state sync logic if the client support the led
|
|
|
|
state extension.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-01-14 10:56:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (down && vs->vd->lock_key_sync &&
|
2013-04-25 07:29:11 +02:00
|
|
|
!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_LED_STATE) &&
|
2010-03-10 17:12:02 +01:00
|
|
|
keycode_is_keypad(vs->vd->kbd_layout, keycode)) {
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
/* If the numlock state needs to change then simulate an additional
|
|
|
|
keypress before sending this one. This will happen if the user
|
|
|
|
toggles numlock away from the VNC window.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
if (keysym_is_numlock(vs->vd->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF)) {
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->modifiers_state[0x45]) {
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_sync_numlock(true);
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 1;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xff7f);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x45]) {
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_sync_numlock(false);
|
2007-10-30 23:38:53 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 0;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xff7f);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-14 10:56:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (down && vs->vd->lock_key_sync &&
|
2013-04-25 07:29:11 +02:00
|
|
|
!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_LED_STATE) &&
|
2010-03-10 17:12:02 +01:00
|
|
|
((sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z') || (sym >= 'a' && sym <= 'z'))) {
|
2009-11-02 12:47:06 +01:00
|
|
|
/* If the capslock state needs to change then simulate an additional
|
|
|
|
keypress before sending this one. This will happen if the user
|
|
|
|
toggles capslock away from the VNC window.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int uppercase = !!(sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z');
|
|
|
|
int shift = !!(vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36]);
|
|
|
|
int capslock = !!(vs->modifiers_state[0x3a]);
|
|
|
|
if (capslock) {
|
|
|
|
if (uppercase == shift) {
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_sync_capslock(false);
|
2009-11-02 12:47:06 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] = 0;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xffe5);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (uppercase != shift) {
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_sync_capslock(true);
|
2009-11-02 12:47:06 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] = 1;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xffe5);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-14 14:27:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (qemu_console_is_graphic(NULL)) {
|
2013-12-02 14:27:18 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_number(vs->vd->dcl.con, keycode, down);
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-11-08 10:02:16 +01:00
|
|
|
bool numlock = vs->modifiers_state[0x45];
|
|
|
|
bool control = (vs->modifiers_state[0x1d] ||
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x9d]);
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* QEMU console emulation */
|
|
|
|
if (down) {
|
|
|
|
switch (keycode) {
|
|
|
|
case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x36: /* Right Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x1d: /* Left CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x9d: /* Right CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x38: /* Left ALT */
|
|
|
|
case 0xb8: /* Right ALT */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xc8:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_UP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xd0:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_DOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xcb:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_LEFT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xcd:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_RIGHT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xd3:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_DELETE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xc7:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_HOME);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xcf:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_END);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xc9:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_PAGEUP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xd1:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_PAGEDOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-06-11 11:32:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 0x47:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '7' : QEMU_KEY_HOME);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x48:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '8' : QEMU_KEY_UP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x49:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '9' : QEMU_KEY_PAGEUP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4b:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '4' : QEMU_KEY_LEFT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4c:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('5');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4d:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '6' : QEMU_KEY_RIGHT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4f:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '1' : QEMU_KEY_END);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x50:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '2' : QEMU_KEY_DOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x51:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '3' : QEMU_KEY_PAGEDOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x52:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('0');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x53:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '.' : QEMU_KEY_DELETE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 0xb5:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('/');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x37:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('*');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4a:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('-');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4e:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('+');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x9c:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('\n');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2011-11-08 10:02:16 +01:00
|
|
|
if (control) {
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(sym & 0x1f);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(sym);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-08-24 22:36:44 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-08 13:18:37 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_release_modifiers(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const int keycodes[] = {
|
|
|
|
/* shift, control, alt keys, both left & right */
|
|
|
|
0x2a, 0x36, 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xb8,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int i, keycode;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-14 14:27:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!qemu_console_is_graphic(NULL)) {
|
2012-02-08 13:18:37 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(keycodes); i++) {
|
|
|
|
keycode = keycodes[i];
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->modifiers_state[keycode]) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-12-02 14:27:18 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_input_event_send_key_number(vs->vd->dcl.con, keycode, false);
|
2012-02-08 13:18:37 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
static const char *code2name(int keycode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return QKeyCode_lookup[qemu_input_key_number_to_qcode(keycode)];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 23:44:22 +02:00
|
|
|
static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
int keycode;
|
2009-12-11 11:25:07 +01:00
|
|
|
int lsym = sym;
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-14 14:27:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (lsym >= 'A' && lsym <= 'Z' && qemu_console_is_graphic(NULL)) {
|
2009-12-11 11:25:07 +01:00
|
|
|
lsym = lsym - 'A' + 'a';
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-28 21:03:00 +01:00
|
|
|
keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->vd->kbd_layout, lsym & 0xFFFF) & SCANCODE_KEYMASK;
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_event_map(down, sym, keycode, code2name(keycode));
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
if (keyboard_layout) {
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
key_event(vs, down, sym);
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_event_ext(down, sym, keycode, code2name(keycode));
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym);
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 23:44:22 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vs->need_update = 1;
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (incremental) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-23 16:03:14 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->force_update = 1;
|
2015-10-30 12:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_area_dirty(vs->dirty, vs->vd, x, y, w, h);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
2013-02-28 17:16:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_EXT_KEY_EVENT);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
static void send_ext_audio_ack(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
2013-02-28 17:16:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_AUDIO);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
static void set_encodings(VncState *vs, int32_t *encodings, size_t n_encodings)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned int enc = 0;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->features = 0;
|
2010-05-19 09:24:01 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = 0;
|
2010-07-07 20:57:59 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->tight.compression = 9;
|
|
|
|
vs->tight.quality = -1; /* Lossless by default */
|
2007-02-05 21:14:10 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->absolute = -1;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 09:24:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Start from the end because the encodings are sent in order of preference.
|
2011-11-22 11:06:24 +01:00
|
|
|
* This way the preferred encoding (first encoding defined in the array)
|
2010-05-19 09:24:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* will be set at the end of the loop.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = n_encodings - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
enc = encodings[i];
|
|
|
|
switch (enc) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_RAW:
|
2010-05-19 09:24:01 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_COPYRECT:
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT_MASK;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_HEXTILE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_HEXTILE_MASK;
|
2010-05-19 09:24:01 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-19 09:24:10 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_TIGHT_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2012-05-16 14:54:25 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
|
2010-07-07 20:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_TIGHT_PNG_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2012-05-16 14:54:25 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-02-02 16:58:54 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZLIB:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_ZLIB_MASK;
|
2010-05-19 09:24:01 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:54 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-02-04 09:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZRLE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_ZRLE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZYWRLE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_ZYWRLE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-21 11:54:34 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_RICH_CURSOR:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_RICH_CURSOR_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_EXT_KEY_EVENT:
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
send_ext_key_event_ack(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_AUDIO:
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
send_ext_audio_ack(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_WMVi:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_WMVI_MASK;
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-04-25 07:29:10 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_LED_STATE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_LED_STATE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:43 +01:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_COMPRESSLEVEL0 ... VNC_ENCODING_COMPRESSLEVEL0 + 9:
|
2010-07-07 20:57:59 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->tight.compression = (enc & 0x0F);
|
2009-02-02 16:58:43 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_QUALITYLEVEL0 ... VNC_ENCODING_QUALITYLEVEL0 + 9:
|
2011-02-04 09:05:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->lossy) {
|
|
|
|
vs->tight.quality = (enc & 0x0F);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-02 16:58:43 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 16:58:29 +01:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Unknown encoding: %d (0x%.8x): %d\n", i, enc, enc);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-25 18:25:17 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_desktop_resize(vs);
|
2011-06-20 14:06:26 +02:00
|
|
|
check_pointer_type_change(&vs->mouse_mode_notifier, NULL);
|
2013-04-25 07:29:10 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_led_state_change(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-15 23:17:38 +01:00
|
|
|
static void set_pixel_conversion(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
pixman_format_code_t fmt = qemu_pixman_get_format(&vs->client_pf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fmt == VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
|
2009-01-15 23:17:38 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_copy;
|
2010-05-03 14:31:34 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 0);
|
2009-01-15 23:17:38 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_generic;
|
2010-05-03 14:31:34 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 1);
|
2009-01-15 23:17:38 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
|
|
|
|
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
|
|
|
|
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
|
|
|
|
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!true_color_flag) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
2006-05-14 20:11:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-27 12:41:44 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (bits_per_pixel) {
|
|
|
|
case 8:
|
|
|
|
case 16:
|
|
|
|
case 32:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-03 14:24:17 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
|
2015-12-03 14:24:17 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gbits = hweight_long(green_max);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gshift = green_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
|
2015-12-03 14:24:17 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bbits = hweight_long(blue_max);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bshift = blue_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
|
2009-01-15 23:17:38 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
graphic_hw_invalidate(vs->vd->dcl.con);
|
|
|
|
graphic_hw_update(vs->vd->dcl.con);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
static void pixel_format_message (VncState *vs) {
|
|
|
|
char pad[3] = { 0, 0, 0 };
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf = qemu_default_pixelformat(32);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel); /* bits-per-pixel */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.depth); /* depth */
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-07-27 16:13:06 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef HOST_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* big-endian-flag */
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* big-endian-flag */
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* true-color-flag */
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.rmax); /* red-max */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.gmax); /* green-max */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.bmax); /* blue-max */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.rshift); /* red-shift */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.gshift); /* green-shift */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.bshift); /* blue-shift */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, pad, 3); /* padding */
|
2010-05-03 14:31:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 0);
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_copy;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs)
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_WMVI)) {
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Sending a WMVi message to notify the client*/
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
|
2013-02-28 17:16:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0,
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server),
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server),
|
2013-02-28 17:16:48 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_WMVi);
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
pixel_format_message(vs);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-01-15 23:17:38 +01:00
|
|
|
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
|
2008-09-15 18:03:41 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t limit;
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[0] > 3) {
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE);
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (data[0]) {
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_SET_PIXEL_FORMAT:
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 20;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_pixel_format(vs, read_u8(data, 4), read_u8(data, 5),
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 6), read_u8(data, 7),
|
|
|
|
read_u16(data, 8), read_u16(data, 10),
|
|
|
|
read_u16(data, 12), read_u8(data, 14),
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 15), read_u8(data, 16));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_SET_ENCODINGS:
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 4;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 4) {
|
2008-12-22 22:06:23 +01:00
|
|
|
limit = read_u16(data, 2);
|
|
|
|
if (limit > 0)
|
|
|
|
return 4 + (limit * 4);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
limit = read_u16(data, 2);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) {
|
|
|
|
int32_t val = read_s32(data, 4 + (i * 4));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 4 + (i * 4), &val, sizeof(val));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
set_encodings(vs, (int32_t *)(data + 4), limit);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE_REQUEST:
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 10;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
framebuffer_update_request(vs,
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4),
|
|
|
|
read_u16(data, 6), read_u16(data, 8));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_KEY_EVENT:
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 8;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
key_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u32(data, 4));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_POINTER_EVENT:
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 6;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
pointer_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_CUT_TEXT:
|
2014-06-30 10:07:54 +02:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return 8;
|
2014-06-30 10:07:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 8) {
|
2007-09-13 14:41:42 +02:00
|
|
|
uint32_t dlen = read_u32(data, 4);
|
2014-06-30 10:07:54 +02:00
|
|
|
if (dlen > (1 << 20)) {
|
|
|
|
error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes"
|
|
|
|
" which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dlen > 0) {
|
2007-09-13 14:41:42 +02:00
|
|
|
return 8 + dlen;
|
2014-06-30 10:07:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-13 14:41:42 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU:
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (read_u8(data, 1)) {
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_EXT_KEY_EVENT:
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
if (len == 2)
|
|
|
|
return 12;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ext_key_event(vs, read_u16(data, 2),
|
|
|
|
read_u32(data, 4), read_u32(data, 8));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO:
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 2)
|
|
|
|
return 4;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (read_u16 (data, 2)) {
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_ENABLE:
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
audio_add(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_DISABLE:
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
audio_del(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 19:20:43 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_SET_FORMAT:
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (len == 4)
|
|
|
|
return 10;
|
|
|
|
switch (read_u8(data, 4)) {
|
|
|
|
case 0: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U8; break;
|
|
|
|
case 1: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S8; break;
|
|
|
|
case 2: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U16; break;
|
|
|
|
case 3: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S16; break;
|
|
|
|
case 4: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U32; break;
|
|
|
|
case 5: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S32; break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2015-03-17 14:42:54 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Invalid audio format %d\n", read_u8(data, 4));
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->as.nchannels = read_u8(data, 5);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->as.nchannels != 1 && vs->as.nchannels != 2) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:54 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Invalid audio channel coount %d\n",
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 5));
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->as.freq = read_u32(data, 6);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2015-03-17 14:42:54 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Invalid audio message %d\n", read_u8(data, 4));
|
2008-12-01 21:57:48 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2015-03-17 14:42:54 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Msg: %d\n", read_u16(data, 0));
|
2008-08-24 01:27:37 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2015-03-17 14:42:54 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Msg: %d\n", data[0]);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-16 23:08:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_init(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-03-19 16:17:08 +01:00
|
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
VncShareMode mode;
|
2007-03-19 16:17:08 +01:00
|
|
|
int size;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
mode = data[0] ? VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED : VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE;
|
|
|
|
switch (vs->vd->share_policy) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_IGNORE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ignore the shared flag. Nothing to do here.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Doesn't conform to the rfb spec but is traditional qemu
|
|
|
|
* behavior, thus left here as option for compatibility
|
|
|
|
* reasons.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Policy: Allow clients ask for exclusive access.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation: When a client asks for exclusive access,
|
|
|
|
* disconnect all others. Shared connects are allowed as long
|
|
|
|
* as no exclusive connection exists.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is how the rfb spec suggests to handle the shared flag.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
|
|
|
|
VncState *client;
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(client, &vs->vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs == client) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client->share_mode != VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE &&
|
|
|
|
client->share_mode != VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(client);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->num_exclusive > 0) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_FORCE_SHARED:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Policy: Shared connects only.
|
|
|
|
* Implementation: Disallow clients asking for exclusive access.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Useful for shared desktop sessions where you don't want
|
|
|
|
* someone forgetting to say -shared when running the vnc
|
|
|
|
* client disconnect everybody else.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, mode);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->num_shared > vs->vd->connections_limit) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->client_width = pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_height = pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server);
|
2010-05-25 18:25:18 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_width);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_height);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-09-15 18:05:16 +02:00
|
|
|
pixel_format_message(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2007-03-19 16:17:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (qemu_name)
|
|
|
|
size = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "QEMU (%s)", qemu_name);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
size = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "QEMU");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_cache_auth(vs);
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_qmp_event(vs, QAPI_EVENT_VNC_INITIALIZED);
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void start_client_init(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_init, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
static void make_challenge(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
srand(time(NULL)+getpid()+getpid()*987654+rand());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0 ; i < sizeof(vs->challenge) ; i++)
|
|
|
|
vs->challenge[i] = (int) (256.0*rand()/(RAND_MAX+1.0));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_auth_vnc(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned char response[VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE];
|
2015-07-01 19:10:38 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t i, pwlen;
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned char key[8];
|
2010-10-07 11:50:45 +02:00
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2015-07-22 11:08:53 +02:00
|
|
|
QCryptoCipher *cipher = NULL;
|
2015-07-01 19:10:38 +02:00
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-31 21:27:36 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->vd->password) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("No password configured on server");
|
2010-10-07 11:50:24 +02:00
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-10-07 11:50:45 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->expires < now) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Password is expired");
|
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(response, vs->challenge, VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the expected challenge response */
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
pwlen = strlen(vs->vd->password);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sizeof(key); i++)
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
key[i] = i<pwlen ? vs->vd->password[i] : 0;
|
2015-07-01 19:10:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cipher = qcrypto_cipher_new(
|
|
|
|
QCRYPTO_CIPHER_ALG_DES_RFB,
|
|
|
|
QCRYPTO_CIPHER_MODE_ECB,
|
|
|
|
key, G_N_ELEMENTS(key),
|
|
|
|
&err);
|
|
|
|
if (!cipher) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Cannot initialize cipher %s",
|
|
|
|
error_get_pretty(err));
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-14 14:51:40 +02:00
|
|
|
if (qcrypto_cipher_encrypt(cipher,
|
2015-07-01 19:10:38 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->challenge,
|
|
|
|
response,
|
|
|
|
VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
&err) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Cannot encrypt challenge %s",
|
|
|
|
error_get_pretty(err));
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Compare expected vs actual challenge response */
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(response, data, VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE) != 0) {
|
2011-11-22 11:06:24 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client challenge response did not match\n");
|
2010-10-07 11:50:24 +02:00
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accepting VNC challenge response\n");
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 0); /* Accept auth */
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
start_client_init(vs);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-22 11:08:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qcrypto_cipher_free(cipher);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-10-07 11:50:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reject:
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 1); /* Reject auth */
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
static const char err[] = "Authentication failed";
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, err, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
2015-07-22 11:08:53 +02:00
|
|
|
qcrypto_cipher_free(cipher);
|
2010-10-07 11:50:24 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
void start_auth_vnc(VncState *vs)
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
make_challenge(vs);
|
|
|
|
/* Send client a 'random' challenge */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, vs->challenge, sizeof(vs->challenge));
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_vnc, sizeof(vs->challenge));
|
2007-08-25 03:39:10 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_auth(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* We only advertise 1 auth scheme at a time, so client
|
|
|
|
* must pick the one we sent. Verify this */
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (data[0] != vs->auth) { /* Reject auth */
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:32 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Reject auth %d because it didn't match advertized\n", (int)data[0]);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
static const char err[] = "Authentication failed";
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, err, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Accept requested auth */
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client requested auth %d\n", (int)data[0]);
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (vs->auth) {
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_NONE:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accept auth none\n");
|
2007-10-31 02:58:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 0); /* Accept auth completion */
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
start_client_init(vs);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VNC:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Start VNC auth\n");
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
start_auth_vnc(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 03:37:51 +02:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT:
|
2011-11-29 09:52:38 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accept VeNCrypt auth\n");
|
2009-03-06 21:27:23 +01:00
|
|
|
start_auth_vencrypt(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:51 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accept SASL auth\n");
|
|
|
|
start_auth_sasl(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
default: /* Should not be possible, but just in case */
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Reject auth %d server code bug\n", vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
static const char err[] = "Authentication failed";
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, err, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 04:02:09 +01:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_version(VncState *vs, uint8_t *version, size_t len)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char local[13];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(local, version, 12);
|
|
|
|
local[12] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (sscanf(local, "RFB %03d.%03d\n", &vs->major, &vs->minor) != 2) {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Malformed protocol version %s\n", local);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client request protocol version %d.%d\n", vs->major, vs->minor);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->major != 3 ||
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
(vs->minor != 3 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 4 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 5 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 7 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 8)) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Unsupported client version\n");
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, VNC_AUTH_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-30 15:01:15 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Some broken clients report v3.4 or v3.5, which spec requires to be treated
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
* as equivalent to v3.3 by servers
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-09-30 15:01:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->minor == 4 || vs->minor == 5)
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->minor = 3;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor == 3) {
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_NONE) {
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Tell client auth none\n");
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
start_client_init(vs);
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_VNC) {
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Tell client VNC auth\n");
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
start_auth_vnc(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Unsupported auth %d for protocol 3.3\n", vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, VNC_AUTH_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Telling client we support auth %d\n", vs->auth);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* num auth */
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->auth);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth, 1);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
static VncRectStat *vnc_stat_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct VncSurface *vs = &vd->guest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return &vs->stats[y / VNC_STAT_RECT][x / VNC_STAT_RECT];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
void vnc_sent_lossy_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
w = (x + w) / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
h = (y + h) / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
x /= VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
y /= VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:06:03 +01:00
|
|
|
for (j = y; j <= h; j++) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = x; i <= w; i++) {
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect[j][i] = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
|
|
|
int sty = y / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
int stx = x / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
int has_dirty = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
y = y / VNC_STAT_RECT * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
x = x / VNC_STAT_RECT * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
2011-02-04 09:06:05 +01:00
|
|
|
int j;
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* kernel send buffers are full -> refresh later */
|
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->lossy_rect[sty][stx]) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 09:06:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect[sty][stx] = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < VNC_STAT_RECT; ++j) {
|
2014-01-08 10:08:33 +01:00
|
|
|
bitmap_set(vs->dirty[y + j],
|
|
|
|
x / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT,
|
|
|
|
VNC_STAT_RECT / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
has_dirty++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 09:06:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_stats(VncDisplay *vd, struct timeval * tv)
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
int width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
int height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
int x, y;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval res;
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
int has_dirty = 0;
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < height; y += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x < width; x += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
VncRectStat *rect = vnc_stat_rect(vd, x, y);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rect->updated = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-13 11:30:52 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_timersub(tv, &VNC_REFRESH_STATS, &res);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timercmp(&vd->guest.last_freq_check, &res, >)) {
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vd->guest.last_freq_check = *tv;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < height; y += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x < width; x += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
VncRectStat *rect= vnc_stat_rect(vd, x, y);
|
|
|
|
int count = ARRAY_SIZE(rect->times);
|
|
|
|
struct timeval min, max;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!timerisset(&rect->times[count - 1])) {
|
|
|
|
continue ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
max = rect->times[(rect->idx + count - 1) % count];
|
2011-03-13 11:30:52 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_timersub(tv, &max, &res);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timercmp(&res, &VNC_REFRESH_LOSSY, >)) {
|
|
|
|
rect->freq = 0;
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
has_dirty += vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(vd, x, y);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
memset(rect->times, 0, sizeof (rect->times));
|
|
|
|
continue ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
min = rect->times[rect->idx];
|
|
|
|
max = rect->times[(rect->idx + count - 1) % count];
|
2011-03-13 11:30:52 +01:00
|
|
|
qemu_timersub(&max, &min, &res);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rect->freq = res.tv_sec + res.tv_usec / 1000000.;
|
|
|
|
rect->freq /= count;
|
|
|
|
rect->freq = 1. / rect->freq;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
double vnc_update_freq(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
double total = 0;
|
|
|
|
int num = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x = (x / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
y = (y / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (j = y; j <= y + h; j += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = x; i <= x + w; i += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
total += vnc_stat_rect(vs->vd, i, j)->freq;
|
|
|
|
num++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
return total / num;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_rect_updated(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y, struct timeval * tv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncRectStat *rect;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rect = vnc_stat_rect(vd, x, y);
|
|
|
|
if (rect->updated) {
|
|
|
|
return ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rect->times[rect->idx] = *tv;
|
|
|
|
rect->idx = (rect->idx + 1) % ARRAY_SIZE(rect->times);
|
|
|
|
rect->updated = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
int width = MIN(pixman_image_get_width(vd->guest.fb),
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_width(vd->server));
|
|
|
|
int height = MIN(pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb),
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_height(vd->server));
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
int cmp_bytes, server_stride, line_bytes, guest_ll, guest_stride, y = 0;
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *guest_row0 = NULL, *server_row0;
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
int has_dirty = 0;
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
pixman_image_t *tmpbuf = NULL;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:06:08 +01:00
|
|
|
struct timeval tv = { 0, 0 };
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 09:06:08 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vd->non_adaptive) {
|
|
|
|
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
|
|
|
|
has_dirty = vnc_update_stats(vd, &tv);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 09:05:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk through the guest dirty map.
|
|
|
|
* Check and copy modified bits from guest to server surface.
|
|
|
|
* Update server dirty map.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
server_row0 = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->server);
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
server_stride = guest_stride = guest_ll =
|
|
|
|
pixman_image_get_stride(vd->server);
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
cmp_bytes = MIN(VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES,
|
|
|
|
server_stride);
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vd->guest.format != VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
|
|
|
|
int width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
tmpbuf = qemu_pixman_linebuf_create(VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT, width);
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
int guest_bpp =
|
|
|
|
PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(pixman_image_get_format(vd->guest.fb));
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
guest_row0 = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
guest_stride = pixman_image_get_stride(vd->guest.fb);
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
guest_ll = pixman_image_get_width(vd->guest.fb) * ((guest_bpp + 7) / 8);
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
line_bytes = MIN(server_stride, guest_ll);
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
int x;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *guest_ptr, *server_ptr;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long offset = find_next_bit((unsigned long *) &vd->guest.dirty,
|
|
|
|
height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(&vd->guest),
|
|
|
|
y * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(&vd->guest));
|
|
|
|
if (offset == height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(&vd->guest)) {
|
|
|
|
/* no more dirty bits */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
y = offset / VNC_DIRTY_BPL(&vd->guest);
|
|
|
|
x = offset % VNC_DIRTY_BPL(&vd->guest);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
server_ptr = server_row0 + y * server_stride + x * cmp_bytes;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vd->guest.format != VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_linebuf_fill(tmpbuf, vd->guest.fb, width, 0, y);
|
|
|
|
guest_ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(tmpbuf);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
guest_ptr = guest_row0 + y * guest_stride;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guest_ptr += x * cmp_bytes;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (; x < DIV_ROUND_UP(width, VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
|
|
|
|
x++, guest_ptr += cmp_bytes, server_ptr += cmp_bytes) {
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
int _cmp_bytes = cmp_bytes;
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!test_and_clear_bit(x, vd->guest.dirty[y])) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((x + 1) * cmp_bytes > line_bytes) {
|
|
|
|
_cmp_bytes = line_bytes - x * cmp_bytes;
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-17 19:56:53 +02:00
|
|
|
assert(_cmp_bytes >= 0);
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(server_ptr, guest_ptr, _cmp_bytes) == 0) {
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-30 10:57:51 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(server_ptr, guest_ptr, _cmp_bytes);
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vd->non_adaptive) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_rect_updated(vd, x * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT,
|
|
|
|
y, &tv);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
set_bit(x, vs->dirty[y]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
has_dirty++;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-08 10:08:35 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
y++;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 13:29:43 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_image_unref(tmpbuf);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl)
|
2009-08-03 11:54:05 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs, *vn;
|
|
|
|
int has_dirty, rects = 0;
|
2009-08-03 11:54:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-29 09:00:40 +02:00
|
|
|
if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vd->clients)) {
|
|
|
|
update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
graphic_hw_update(vd->dcl.con);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_trylock_display(vd)) {
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
has_dirty = vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_display(vd);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
|
2014-03-06 13:54:28 +01:00
|
|
|
rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty, false);
|
2010-01-25 13:54:57 +01:00
|
|
|
/* vs might be free()ed here */
|
2009-08-03 11:54:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
if (has_dirty && rects) {
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
vd->dcl.update_interval /= 2;
|
|
|
|
if (vd->dcl.update_interval < VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE) {
|
|
|
|
vd->dcl.update_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 11:56:01 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
vd->dcl.update_interval += VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_INC;
|
|
|
|
if (vd->dcl.update_interval > VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
vd->dcl.update_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 11:54:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_connect(VncDisplay *vd, QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
|
2013-06-11 13:42:44 +02:00
|
|
|
bool skipauth, bool websocket)
|
2008-02-03 03:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-11-03 17:12:03 +01:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs = g_new0(VncState, 1);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->sioc = sioc;
|
|
|
|
object_ref(OBJECT(vs->sioc));
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
|
|
|
|
object_ref(OBJECT(vs->ioc));
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->vd = vd;
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->input, "vnc-input/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->output, "vnc-output/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->jobs_buffer, "vnc-jobs_buffer/%p", sioc);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->tight.tight, "vnc-tight/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->tight.zlib, "vnc-tight-zlib/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->tight.gradient, "vnc-tight-gradient/%p", sioc);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:02 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_JPEG
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->tight.jpeg, "vnc-tight-jpeg/%p", sioc);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:02 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->tight.png, "vnc-tight-png/%p", sioc);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:02 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->zlib.zlib, "vnc-zlib/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->zrle.zrle, "vnc-zrle/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->zrle.fb, "vnc-zrle-fb/%p", sioc);
|
|
|
|
buffer_init(&vs->zrle.zlib, "vnc-zrle-zlib/%p", sioc);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:02 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (skipauth) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = vd->ws_auth;
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = vd->auth;
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = vd->subauth;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client sioc=%p ws=%d auth=%d subauth=%d\n",
|
|
|
|
sioc, websocket, vs->auth, vs->subauth);
|
2011-06-23 14:31:41 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2011-08-21 05:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect = g_malloc0(VNC_STAT_ROWS * sizeof (*vs->lossy_rect));
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < VNC_STAT_ROWS; ++i) {
|
2015-11-03 17:12:03 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect[i] = g_new0(uint8_t, VNC_STAT_COLS);
|
2011-02-04 09:05:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("New client on socket %p\n", vs->sioc);
|
2013-03-14 11:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
qio_channel_set_blocking(vs->ioc, false, NULL);
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->websocket = 1;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vd->ws_tls) {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->ioc_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, G_IO_IN, vncws_tls_handshake_io, vs, NULL);
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->ioc_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, G_IO_IN, vncws_handshake_io, vs, NULL);
|
2013-04-23 16:33:01 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
vs->ioc, G_IO_IN, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_cache_addr(vs);
|
2014-06-18 08:43:49 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_qmp_event(vs, QAPI_EVENT_VNC_CONNECTED);
|
2011-11-24 18:10:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING);
|
2010-01-14 17:50:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-01 19:10:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->websocket) {
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_state(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vd->num_connecting > vd->connections_limit) {
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->share_mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vnc_init_state(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-21 11:04:45 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->initialized = true;
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
2015-10-30 12:10:09 +01:00
|
|
|
bool first_client = QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vd->clients);
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->last_x = -1;
|
|
|
|
vs->last_y = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vs->as.freq = 44100;
|
|
|
|
vs->as.nchannels = 2;
|
|
|
|
vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S16;
|
|
|
|
vs->as.endianness = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_mutex_init(&vs->output_mutex);
|
2012-03-14 07:58:47 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->bh = qemu_bh_new(vnc_jobs_bh, vs);
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&vd->clients, vs, next);
|
2015-10-30 12:10:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (first_client) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_update_server_surface(vd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
graphic_hw_update(vd->dcl.con);
|
2009-08-03 11:54:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-03 03:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, "RFB 003.008\n", 12);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_version, 12);
|
2008-12-01 21:57:52 +01:00
|
|
|
reset_keys(vs);
|
2010-03-10 17:12:02 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->lock_key_sync)
|
|
|
|
vs->led = qemu_add_led_event_handler(kbd_leds, vs);
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2010-03-10 16:38:29 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->mouse_mode_notifier.notify = check_pointer_type_change;
|
|
|
|
qemu_add_mouse_mode_change_notifier(&vs->mouse_mode_notifier);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 14:19:48 +02:00
|
|
|
/* vs might be free()ed here */
|
2008-02-03 03:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
static gboolean vnc_listen_io(QIOChannel *ioc,
|
|
|
|
GIOCondition condition,
|
|
|
|
void *opaque)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-02-16 15:59:30 +01:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = opaque;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
QIOChannelSocket *sioc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-14 22:45:55 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Catch-up */
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
graphic_hw_update(vs->dcl.con);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
sioc = qio_channel_socket_accept(QIO_CHANNEL_SOCKET(ioc), &err);
|
|
|
|
if (sioc != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
qio_channel_set_delay(QIO_CHANNEL(sioc), false);
|
|
|
|
vnc_connect(vs, sioc, false,
|
|
|
|
ioc != QIO_CHANNEL(vs->lsock));
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(sioc));
|
2015-07-01 19:10:36 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
/* client probably closed connection before we got there */
|
|
|
|
error_free(err);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 14:51:41 +01:00
|
|
|
static const DisplayChangeListenerOps dcl_ops = {
|
2014-07-07 09:18:19 +02:00
|
|
|
.dpy_name = "vnc",
|
|
|
|
.dpy_refresh = vnc_refresh,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_copy = vnc_dpy_copy,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_update = vnc_dpy_update,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_switch = vnc_dpy_switch,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_check_format = qemu_pixman_check_format,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_mouse_set = vnc_mouse_set,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_cursor_define = vnc_dpy_cursor_define,
|
2012-11-13 14:51:41 +01:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
void vnc_display_init(const char *id)
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_display_find(id) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs = g_malloc0(sizeof(*vs));
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->id = strdup(id);
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&vnc_displays, vs, next);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 12:04:05 +01:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INIT(&vs->clients);
|
2010-10-07 11:50:45 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->expires = TIME_MAX;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
if (keyboard_layout) {
|
|
|
|
trace_vnc_key_map_init(keyboard_layout);
|
2009-03-06 21:27:10 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(name2keysym, keyboard_layout);
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-03-06 21:27:10 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(name2keysym, "en-us");
|
2014-05-21 13:18:20 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->kbd_layout)
|
2009-03-06 21:27:40 +01:00
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 20:58:02 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_mutex_init(&vs->mutex);
|
|
|
|
vnc_start_worker_thread();
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 11:34:31 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->dcl.ops = &dcl_ops;
|
2013-04-23 15:44:31 +02:00
|
|
|
register_displaychangelistener(&vs->dcl);
|
2007-08-25 03:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 03:39:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_display_close(VncDisplay *vs)
|
2007-08-25 03:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-02-11 22:00:38 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!vs)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2015-02-19 10:46:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->enabled = false;
|
|
|
|
vs->is_unix = false;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->lsock != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->lsock_tag) {
|
|
|
|
g_source_remove(vs->lsock_tag);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(vs->lsock));
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = NULL;
|
2007-08-25 03:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-19 10:46:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->ws_enabled = false;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->lwebsock != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->lwebsock_tag) {
|
|
|
|
g_source_remove(vs->lwebsock_tag);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(vs->lwebsock));
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = NULL;
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:51 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->tlscreds) {
|
|
|
|
object_unparent(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds));
|
2016-01-12 13:52:39 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->tlscreds = NULL;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
g_free(vs->tlsaclname);
|
|
|
|
vs->tlsaclname = NULL;
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
int vnc_display_password(const char *id, const char *password)
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display_find(id);
|
2007-08-25 03:37:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2009-07-30 12:15:00 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
2011-12-07 13:19:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2009-07-30 12:15:00 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-12-11 13:15:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
error_printf_unless_qmp("If you want use passwords please enable "
|
|
|
|
"password auth using '-vnc ${dpy},password'.");
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2011-01-31 21:27:36 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 18:47:43 +02:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->password);
|
2014-06-06 18:47:44 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->password = g_strdup(password);
|
2011-12-07 13:19:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-08-25 03:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
int vnc_display_pw_expire(const char *id, time_t expires)
|
2010-10-07 11:50:45 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display_find(id);
|
2010-10-07 11:50:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 10:55:01 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-07 11:50:45 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->expires = expires;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
char *vnc_display_local_addr(const char *id)
|
2009-05-20 20:01:02 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display_find(id);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SocketAddress *addr;
|
|
|
|
char *ret;
|
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-11 17:33:33 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(vs);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addr = qio_channel_socket_get_local_address(vs->lsock, &err);
|
|
|
|
if (!addr) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (addr->type != SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_INET) {
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = g_strdup_printf("%s;%s", addr->u.inet->host, addr->u.inet->port);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-05-20 20:01:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
static QemuOptsList qemu_vnc_opts = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "vnc",
|
|
|
|
.head = QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(qemu_vnc_opts.head),
|
|
|
|
.implied_opt_name = "vnc",
|
|
|
|
.desc = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "vnc",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "websocket",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
.name = "tls-creds",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
/* Deprecated in favour of tls-creds */
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
.name = "x509",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "share",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "display",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "head",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_NUMBER,
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "connections",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_NUMBER,
|
2015-01-30 03:14:34 +01:00
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "to",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_NUMBER,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "ipv4",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "ipv6",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "password",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "reverse",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "lock-key-sync",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "sasl",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Deprecated in favour of tls-creds */
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
.name = "tls",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Deprecated in favour of tls-creds */
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
.name = "x509verify",
|
2015-03-10 17:27:34 +01:00
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_STRING,
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "acl",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "lossy",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},{
|
|
|
|
.name = "non-adaptive",
|
|
|
|
.type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ /* end of list */ }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_display_setup_auth(VncDisplay *vs,
|
|
|
|
bool password,
|
|
|
|
bool sasl,
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
bool websocket,
|
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have a choice of 3 authentication options
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. none
|
|
|
|
* 2. vnc
|
|
|
|
* 3. sasl
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The channel can be run in 2 modes
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. clear
|
|
|
|
* 2. tls
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* And TLS can use 2 types of credentials
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. anon
|
|
|
|
* 2. x509
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We thus have 9 possible logical combinations
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. clear + none
|
|
|
|
* 2. clear + vnc
|
|
|
|
* 3. clear + sasl
|
|
|
|
* 4. tls + anon + none
|
|
|
|
* 5. tls + anon + vnc
|
|
|
|
* 6. tls + anon + sasl
|
|
|
|
* 7. tls + x509 + none
|
|
|
|
* 8. tls + x509 + vnc
|
|
|
|
* 9. tls + x509 + sasl
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* These need to be mapped into the VNC auth schemes
|
|
|
|
* in an appropriate manner. In regular VNC, all the
|
|
|
|
* TLS options get mapped into VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT
|
|
|
|
* sub-auth types.
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In websockets, the https:// protocol already provides
|
|
|
|
* TLS support, so there is no need to make use of the
|
|
|
|
* VeNCrypt extension. Furthermore, websockets browser
|
|
|
|
* clients could not use VeNCrypt even if they wanted to,
|
|
|
|
* as they cannot control when the TLS handshake takes
|
|
|
|
* place. Thus there is no option but to rely on https://,
|
|
|
|
* meaning combinations 4->6 and 7->9 will be mapped to
|
|
|
|
* VNC auth schemes in the same way as combos 1->3.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Regardless of fact that we have a different mapping to
|
|
|
|
* VNC auth mechs for plain VNC vs websockets VNC, the end
|
|
|
|
* result has the same security characteristics.
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (password) {
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->tlscreds) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_tls = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds),
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_X509)) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 password auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds),
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_ANON)) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS password auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSVNC;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"Unsupported TLS cred type %s",
|
|
|
|
object_get_typename(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds)));
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with password auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
} else if (sasl) {
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->tlscreds) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_tls = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds),
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_X509)) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 SASL auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds),
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_ANON)) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS SASL auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"Unsupported TLS cred type %s",
|
|
|
|
object_get_typename(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds)));
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with SASL auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_SASL;
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_SASL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->tlscreds) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_tls = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds),
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_X509)) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 no auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds),
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_ANON)) {
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS no auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSNONE;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"Unsupported TLS cred type %s",
|
|
|
|
object_get_typename(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds)));
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with no auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-17 14:42:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle back compat with old CLI syntax by creating some
|
|
|
|
* suitable QCryptoTLSCreds objects
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static QCryptoTLSCreds *
|
|
|
|
vnc_display_create_creds(bool x509,
|
|
|
|
bool x509verify,
|
|
|
|
const char *dir,
|
|
|
|
const char *id,
|
|
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
gchar *credsid = g_strdup_printf("tlsvnc%s", id);
|
|
|
|
Object *parent = object_get_objects_root();
|
|
|
|
Object *creds;
|
|
|
|
Error *err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (x509) {
|
|
|
|
creds = object_new_with_props(TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_X509,
|
|
|
|
parent,
|
|
|
|
credsid,
|
|
|
|
&err,
|
|
|
|
"endpoint", "server",
|
|
|
|
"dir", dir,
|
|
|
|
"verify-peer", x509verify ? "yes" : "no",
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
creds = object_new_with_props(TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_ANON,
|
|
|
|
parent,
|
|
|
|
credsid,
|
|
|
|
&err,
|
|
|
|
"endpoint", "server",
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_free(credsid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
error_propagate(errp, err);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS(creds);
|
2015-03-17 14:42:56 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp)
|
2007-08-25 03:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display_find(id);
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
QemuOpts *opts = qemu_opts_find(&qemu_vnc_opts, id);
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
SocketAddress *saddr = NULL, *wsaddr = NULL;
|
2015-01-30 03:14:35 +01:00
|
|
|
const char *share, *device_id;
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
QemuConsole *con;
|
2015-01-30 03:14:36 +01:00
|
|
|
bool password = false;
|
|
|
|
bool reverse = false;
|
2015-01-30 03:14:35 +01:00
|
|
|
const char *vnc;
|
2015-02-19 11:31:44 +01:00
|
|
|
char *h;
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
const char *credid;
|
2015-01-30 03:14:36 +01:00
|
|
|
bool sasl = false;
|
2015-03-17 14:42:55 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
int saslErr;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:37 +01:00
|
|
|
int acl = 0;
|
2010-03-10 17:12:02 +01:00
|
|
|
int lock_key_sync = 1;
|
2007-08-25 03:35:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
2012-10-02 10:17:21 +02:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "VNC display not active");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_display_close(vs);
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!opts) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-01-30 03:14:35 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc = qemu_opt_get(opts, "vnc");
|
|
|
|
if (!vnc || strcmp(vnc, "none") == 0) {
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-01-30 03:14:35 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-19 11:31:44 +01:00
|
|
|
h = strrchr(vnc, ':');
|
|
|
|
if (h) {
|
2015-04-27 17:03:14 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t hlen = h - vnc;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
const char *websocket = qemu_opt_get(opts, "websocket");
|
|
|
|
int to = qemu_opt_get_number(opts, "to", 0);
|
|
|
|
bool has_ipv4 = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "ipv4", false);
|
|
|
|
bool has_ipv6 = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "ipv6", false);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
saddr = g_new0(SocketAddress, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
if (!qcrypto_hash_supports(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA1)) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"SHA1 hash support is required for websockets");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wsaddr = g_new0(SocketAddress, 1);
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_enabled = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(vnc, "unix:", 5) == 0) {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->type = SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_UNIX;
|
|
|
|
saddr->u.q_unix = g_new0(UnixSocketAddress, 1);
|
|
|
|
saddr->u.q_unix->path = g_strdup(vnc + 5);
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->ws_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "UNIX sockets not supported with websock");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-27 17:03:14 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned long long baseport;
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->type = SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_INET;
|
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet = g_new0(InetSocketAddress, 1);
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vnc[0] == '[' && vnc[hlen - 1] == ']') {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->host = g_strndup(vnc + 1, hlen - 2);
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->host = g_strndup(vnc, hlen);
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (parse_uint_full(h + 1, &baseport, 10) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "can't convert to a number: %s", h + 1);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (baseport > 65535 ||
|
|
|
|
baseport + 5900 > 65535) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "port %s out of range", h + 1);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->port = g_strdup_printf(
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
"%d", (int)baseport + 5900);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (to) {
|
2015-10-27 07:10:52 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->has_to = true;
|
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->to = to + 5900;
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->ipv4 = saddr->u.inet->has_ipv4 = has_ipv4;
|
|
|
|
saddr->u.inet->ipv6 = saddr->u.inet->has_ipv6 = has_ipv6;
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->ws_enabled) {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
wsaddr->type = SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_INET;
|
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet = g_new0(InetSocketAddress, 1);
|
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet->host = g_strdup(saddr->u.inet->host);
|
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet->port = g_strdup(websocket);
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (to) {
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet->has_to = true;
|
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet->to = to;
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet->ipv4 = wsaddr->u.inet->has_ipv4 = has_ipv4;
|
|
|
|
wsaddr->u.inet->ipv6 = wsaddr->u.inet->has_ipv6 = has_ipv6;
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-27 17:03:14 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-19 11:31:44 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "no vnc port specified");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2015-01-30 03:14:35 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-19 11:31:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
password = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "password", false);
|
2015-07-01 19:10:38 +02:00
|
|
|
if (password) {
|
|
|
|
if (fips_get_state()) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"VNC password auth disabled due to FIPS mode, "
|
|
|
|
"consider using the VeNCrypt or SASL authentication "
|
|
|
|
"methods as an alternative");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!qcrypto_cipher_supports(
|
|
|
|
QCRYPTO_CIPHER_ALG_DES_RFB)) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"Cipher backend does not support DES RFB algorithm");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reverse = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "reverse", false);
|
|
|
|
lock_key_sync = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "lock-key-sync", true);
|
|
|
|
sasl = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "sasl", false);
|
2015-03-17 14:42:55 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (sasl) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "VNC SASL auth requires cyrus-sasl support");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
credid = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-creds");
|
|
|
|
if (credid) {
|
|
|
|
Object *creds;
|
|
|
|
if (qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls") ||
|
|
|
|
qemu_opt_get(opts, "x509") ||
|
|
|
|
qemu_opt_get(opts, "x509verify")) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
2016-01-13 11:36:00 +01:00
|
|
|
"'tls-creds' parameter is mutually exclusive with "
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
"'tls', 'x509' and 'x509verify' parameters");
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
creds = object_resolve_path_component(
|
|
|
|
object_get_objects_root(), credid);
|
|
|
|
if (!creds) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "No TLS credentials with id '%s'",
|
|
|
|
credid);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->tlscreds = (QCryptoTLSCreds *)
|
|
|
|
object_dynamic_cast(creds,
|
|
|
|
TYPE_QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS);
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->tlscreds) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Object with id '%s' is not TLS credentials",
|
|
|
|
credid);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
object_ref(OBJECT(vs->tlscreds));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->tlscreds->endpoint != QCRYPTO_TLS_CREDS_ENDPOINT_SERVER) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"Expecting TLS credentials with a server endpoint");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
const char *path;
|
|
|
|
bool tls = false, x509 = false, x509verify = false;
|
|
|
|
tls = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "tls", false);
|
|
|
|
if (tls) {
|
|
|
|
path = qemu_opt_get(opts, "x509");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (path) {
|
|
|
|
x509 = true;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
path = qemu_opt_get(opts, "x509verify");
|
|
|
|
if (path) {
|
|
|
|
x509 = true;
|
|
|
|
x509verify = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->tlscreds = vnc_display_create_creds(x509,
|
|
|
|
x509verify,
|
|
|
|
path,
|
|
|
|
vs->id,
|
|
|
|
errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->tlscreds) {
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
acl = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "acl", false);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
share = qemu_opt_get(opts, "share");
|
|
|
|
if (share) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(share, "ignore") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_IGNORE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(share, "allow-exclusive") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strcmp(share, "force-shared") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_FORCE_SHARED;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "unknown vnc share= option");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-02 12:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->connections_limit = qemu_opt_get_number(opts, "connections", 32);
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_JPEG
|
|
|
|
vs->lossy = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "lossy", false);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
vs->non_adaptive = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "non-adaptive", false);
|
2014-01-08 10:08:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/* adaptive updates are only used with tight encoding and
|
|
|
|
* if lossy updates are enabled so we can disable all the
|
|
|
|
* calculations otherwise */
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->lossy) {
|
|
|
|
vs->non_adaptive = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (acl) {
|
2014-10-21 14:50:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(vs->id, "default") == 0) {
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->tlsaclname = g_strdup("vnc.x509dname");
|
2014-10-21 14:50:42 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
vs->tlsaclname = g_strdup_printf("vnc.%s.x509dname", vs->id);
|
2014-10-21 14:50:42 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
qemu_acl_init(vs->tlsaclname);
|
2015-03-02 20:01:05 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:37 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (acl && sasl) {
|
2014-10-21 14:50:42 +02:00
|
|
|
char *aclname;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(vs->id, "default") == 0) {
|
|
|
|
aclname = g_strdup("vnc.username");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
aclname = g_strdup_printf("vnc.%s.username", vs->id);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.acl = qemu_acl_init(aclname);
|
|
|
|
g_free(aclname);
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:37 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_display_setup_auth(vs, password, sasl, vs->ws_enabled, errp) < 0) {
|
ui: convert VNC server to use QCryptoTLSSession
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2015-08-06 15:39:32 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if ((saslErr = sasl_server_init(NULL, "qemu")) != SASL_OK) {
|
2012-10-02 10:17:21 +02:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize SASL auth: %s",
|
|
|
|
sasl_errstring(saslErr, NULL, NULL));
|
2012-10-18 09:07:05 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-03-10 17:12:02 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lock_key_sync = lock_key_sync;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
device_id = qemu_opt_get(opts, "display");
|
|
|
|
if (device_id) {
|
|
|
|
DeviceState *dev;
|
|
|
|
int head = qemu_opt_get_number(opts, "head", 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev = qdev_find_recursive(sysbus_get_default(), device_id);
|
|
|
|
if (dev == NULL) {
|
2015-03-13 18:43:09 +01:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Device '%s' not found", device_id);
|
2014-09-18 12:54:49 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
con = qemu_console_lookup_by_device(dev, head);
|
|
|
|
if (con == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Device %s is not bound to a QemuConsole",
|
|
|
|
device_id);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
con = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (con != vs->dcl.con) {
|
|
|
|
unregister_displaychangelistener(&vs->dcl);
|
|
|
|
vs->dcl.con = con;
|
|
|
|
register_displaychangelistener(&vs->dcl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-03 03:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if (reverse) {
|
2008-11-11 21:51:59 +01:00
|
|
|
/* connect to viewer */
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
QIOChannelSocket *sioc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = NULL;
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ws_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Cannot use websockets in reverse mode");
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2008-02-03 03:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->is_unix = saddr->type == SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_UNIX;
|
|
|
|
sioc = qio_channel_socket_new();
|
|
|
|
if (qio_channel_socket_connect_sync(sioc, saddr, errp) < 0) {
|
2012-10-18 09:01:01 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_connect(vs, sioc, false, false);
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(sioc));
|
2008-11-11 21:51:59 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lsock = qio_channel_socket_new();
|
|
|
|
if (qio_channel_socket_listen_sync(vs->lsock, saddr, errp) < 0) {
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-26 23:34:55 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->is_unix = saddr->type == SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_UNIX;
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->enabled = true;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ws_enabled) {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = qio_channel_socket_new();
|
|
|
|
if (qio_channel_socket_listen_sync(vs->lwebsock,
|
|
|
|
wsaddr, errp) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(vs->lsock));
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = NULL;
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-11 21:51:59 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
QIO_CHANNEL(vs->lsock),
|
|
|
|
G_IO_IN, vnc_listen_io, vs, NULL);
|
2015-02-19 10:46:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (vs->ws_enabled) {
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock_tag = qio_channel_add_watch(
|
|
|
|
QIO_CHANNEL(vs->lwebsock),
|
|
|
|
G_IO_IN, vnc_listen_io, vs, NULL);
|
2013-01-21 11:04:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(saddr);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(wsaddr);
|
2012-10-02 10:17:21 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2012-10-18 09:07:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
2015-08-14 19:56:44 +02:00
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(saddr);
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_SocketAddress(wsaddr);
|
2015-02-19 10:46:49 +01:00
|
|
|
vs->enabled = false;
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_enabled = false;
|
2006-04-30 23:28:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 14:31:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
void vnc_display_add_client(const char *id, int csock, bool skipauth)
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 14:31:42 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-29 12:24:55 +02:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display_find(id);
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
QIOChannelSocket *sioc;
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 14:31:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 12:14:08 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-27 17:20:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sioc = qio_channel_socket_new_fd(csock, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (sioc) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_connect(vs, sioc, skipauth, false);
|
|
|
|
object_unref(OBJECT(sioc));
|
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 14:31:42 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-17 09:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_auto_assign_id(QemuOptsList *olist, QemuOpts *opts)
|
2015-02-05 10:43:34 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i = 2;
|
|
|
|
char *id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
id = g_strdup("default");
|
|
|
|
while (qemu_opts_find(olist, id)) {
|
|
|
|
g_free(id);
|
|
|
|
id = g_strdup_printf("vnc%d", i++);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
qemu_opts_set_id(opts, id);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
QemuOpts: Wean off qerror_report_err()
qerror_report_err() is a transitional interface to help with
converting existing monitor commands to QMP. It should not be used
elsewhere.
The only remaining user in qemu-option.c is qemu_opts_parse(). Is it
used in QMP context? If not, we can simply replace
qerror_report_err() by error_report_err().
The uses in qemu-img.c, qemu-io.c, qemu-nbd.c and under tests/ are
clearly not in QMP context.
The uses in vl.c aren't either, because the only QMP command handlers
there are qmp_query_status() and qmp_query_machines(), and they don't
call it.
Remaining uses:
* drive_def(): Command line -drive and such, HMP drive_add and pci_add
* hmp_chardev_add(): HMP chardev-add
* monitor_parse_command(): HMP core
* tmp_config_parse(): Command line -tpmdev
* net_host_device_add(): HMP host_net_add
* net_client_parse(): Command line -net and -netdev
* qemu_global_option(): Command line -global
* vnc_parse_func(): Command line -display, -vnc, default display, HMP
change, QMP change. Bummer.
* qemu_pci_hot_add_nic(): HMP pci_add
* usb_net_init(): Command line -usbdevice, HMP usb_add
Propagate errors through qemu_opts_parse(). Create a convenience
function qemu_opts_parse_noisily() that passes errors to
error_report_err(). Switch all non-QMP users outside tests to it.
That leaves vnc_parse_func(). Propagate errors through it. Since I'm
touching it anyway, rename it to vnc_parse().
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
2015-02-13 12:50:26 +01:00
|
|
|
QemuOpts *vnc_parse(const char *str, Error **errp)
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
QemuOptsList *olist = qemu_find_opts("vnc");
|
QemuOpts: Wean off qerror_report_err()
qerror_report_err() is a transitional interface to help with
converting existing monitor commands to QMP. It should not be used
elsewhere.
The only remaining user in qemu-option.c is qemu_opts_parse(). Is it
used in QMP context? If not, we can simply replace
qerror_report_err() by error_report_err().
The uses in qemu-img.c, qemu-io.c, qemu-nbd.c and under tests/ are
clearly not in QMP context.
The uses in vl.c aren't either, because the only QMP command handlers
there are qmp_query_status() and qmp_query_machines(), and they don't
call it.
Remaining uses:
* drive_def(): Command line -drive and such, HMP drive_add and pci_add
* hmp_chardev_add(): HMP chardev-add
* monitor_parse_command(): HMP core
* tmp_config_parse(): Command line -tpmdev
* net_host_device_add(): HMP host_net_add
* net_client_parse(): Command line -net and -netdev
* qemu_global_option(): Command line -global
* vnc_parse_func(): Command line -display, -vnc, default display, HMP
change, QMP change. Bummer.
* qemu_pci_hot_add_nic(): HMP pci_add
* usb_net_init(): Command line -usbdevice, HMP usb_add
Propagate errors through qemu_opts_parse(). Create a convenience
function qemu_opts_parse_noisily() that passes errors to
error_report_err(). Switch all non-QMP users outside tests to it.
That leaves vnc_parse_func(). Propagate errors through it. Since I'm
touching it anyway, rename it to vnc_parse().
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
2015-02-13 12:50:26 +01:00
|
|
|
QemuOpts *opts = qemu_opts_parse(olist, str, true, errp);
|
2015-03-12 08:33:45 +01:00
|
|
|
const char *id;
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-12 08:33:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!opts) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
id = qemu_opts_id(opts);
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!id) {
|
|
|
|
/* auto-assign id if not present */
|
2015-02-05 10:43:34 +01:00
|
|
|
vnc_auto_assign_id(olist, opts);
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-02-17 09:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
return opts;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-13 13:35:14 +01:00
|
|
|
int vnc_init_func(void *opaque, QemuOpts *opts, Error **errp)
|
2015-02-17 09:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Error *local_err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *id = (char *)qemu_opts_id(opts);
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-17 09:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(id);
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
vnc_display_init(id);
|
|
|
|
vnc_display_open(id, &local_err);
|
|
|
|
if (local_err != NULL) {
|
2015-12-18 16:35:14 +01:00
|
|
|
error_reportf_err(local_err, "Failed to start VNC server: ");
|
2014-09-16 12:33:03 +02:00
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_register_config(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
qemu_add_opts(&qemu_vnc_opts);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
machine_init(vnc_register_config);
|