diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c index 70cf313260..9e7eaa1080 100644 --- a/target/arm/helper.c +++ b/target/arm/helper.c @@ -9348,67 +9348,28 @@ static void v8m_security_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, } } -static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, - MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, - hwaddr *phys_ptr, MemTxAttrs *txattrs, - int *prot, uint32_t *fsr) +static bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, + MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + hwaddr *phys_ptr, MemTxAttrs *txattrs, + int *prot, uint32_t *fsr, uint32_t *mregion) { + /* Perform a PMSAv8 MPU lookup (without also doing the SAU check + * that a full phys-to-virt translation does). + * mregion is (if not NULL) set to the region number which matched, + * or -1 if no region number is returned (MPU off, address did not + * hit a region, address hit in multiple regions). + */ ARMCPU *cpu = arm_env_get_cpu(env); bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx); uint32_t secure = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx); int n; int matchregion = -1; bool hit = false; - V8M_SAttributes sattrs = {}; *phys_ptr = address; *prot = 0; - - if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) { - v8m_security_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, &sattrs); - if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { - /* Instruction fetches always use the MMU bank and the - * transaction attribute determined by the fetch address, - * regardless of CPU state. This is painful for QEMU - * to handle, because it would mean we need to encode - * into the mmu_idx not just the (user, negpri) information - * for the current security state but also that for the - * other security state, which would balloon the number - * of mmu_idx values needed alarmingly. - * Fortunately we can avoid this because it's not actually - * possible to arbitrarily execute code from memory with - * the wrong security attribute: it will always generate - * an exception of some kind or another, apart from the - * special case of an NS CPU executing an SG instruction - * in S&NSC memory. So we always just fail the translation - * here and sort things out in the exception handler - * (including possibly emulating an SG instruction). - */ - if (sattrs.ns != !secure) { - *fsr = sattrs.nsc ? M_FAKE_FSR_NSC_EXEC : M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT; - return true; - } - } else { - /* For data accesses we always use the MMU bank indicated - * by the current CPU state, but the security attributes - * might downgrade a secure access to nonsecure. - */ - if (sattrs.ns) { - txattrs->secure = false; - } else if (!secure) { - /* NS access to S memory must fault. - * Architecturally we should first check whether the - * MPU information for this address indicates that we - * are doing an unaligned access to Device memory, which - * should generate a UsageFault instead. QEMU does not - * currently check for that kind of unaligned access though. - * If we added it we would need to do so as a special case - * for M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(). - */ - *fsr = M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT; - return true; - } - } + if (mregion) { + *mregion = -1; } /* Unlike the ARM ARM pseudocode, we don't need to check whether this @@ -9497,12 +9458,79 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, /* We don't need to look the attribute up in the MAIR0/MAIR1 * registers because that only tells us about cacheability. */ + if (mregion) { + *mregion = matchregion; + } } *fsr = 0x00d; /* Permission fault */ return !(*prot & (1 << access_type)); } + +static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, + MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, + hwaddr *phys_ptr, MemTxAttrs *txattrs, + int *prot, uint32_t *fsr) +{ + uint32_t secure = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx); + V8M_SAttributes sattrs = {}; + + if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) { + v8m_security_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, &sattrs); + if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) { + /* Instruction fetches always use the MMU bank and the + * transaction attribute determined by the fetch address, + * regardless of CPU state. This is painful for QEMU + * to handle, because it would mean we need to encode + * into the mmu_idx not just the (user, negpri) information + * for the current security state but also that for the + * other security state, which would balloon the number + * of mmu_idx values needed alarmingly. + * Fortunately we can avoid this because it's not actually + * possible to arbitrarily execute code from memory with + * the wrong security attribute: it will always generate + * an exception of some kind or another, apart from the + * special case of an NS CPU executing an SG instruction + * in S&NSC memory. So we always just fail the translation + * here and sort things out in the exception handler + * (including possibly emulating an SG instruction). + */ + if (sattrs.ns != !secure) { + *fsr = sattrs.nsc ? M_FAKE_FSR_NSC_EXEC : M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT; + *phys_ptr = address; + *prot = 0; + return true; + } + } else { + /* For data accesses we always use the MMU bank indicated + * by the current CPU state, but the security attributes + * might downgrade a secure access to nonsecure. + */ + if (sattrs.ns) { + txattrs->secure = false; + } else if (!secure) { + /* NS access to S memory must fault. + * Architecturally we should first check whether the + * MPU information for this address indicates that we + * are doing an unaligned access to Device memory, which + * should generate a UsageFault instead. QEMU does not + * currently check for that kind of unaligned access though. + * If we added it we would need to do so as a special case + * for M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(). + */ + *fsr = M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT; + *phys_ptr = address; + *prot = 0; + return true; + } + } + } + + return pmsav8_mpu_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, phys_ptr, + txattrs, prot, fsr, NULL); +} + static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address, MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, hwaddr *phys_ptr, int *prot, uint32_t *fsr)