We did this with scripts/coccinelle/use-error_fatal.cocci before, in
commit 50beeb6809 and 007b06578a. This commit cleans up rarer
variations that don't seem worth matching with Coccinelle.
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210720125408.387910-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
The SEV userspace header[1] exports a couple of other error conditions that
aren't listed in QEMU's SEV implementation, so let's just round out the
list.
[1] linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h
Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210430134830.254741-3-ckuehl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
This can help lower any margin for error when making future additions to
the list, especially if they're made out of order.
While doing so, make capitalization of ASID consistent with its usage in
the SEV firmware spec (Asid -> ASID).
Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210430134830.254741-2-ckuehl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
The SEV FW >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query the
attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory
and VMSA encrypted with the LAUNCH_UPDATE and sign it with the PEK.
Note, we already have a command (LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be used to
query the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory encrypted through the
LAUNCH_UPDATE. The main difference between previous and this command
is that the report is signed with the PEK and unlike the LAUNCH_MEASURE
command the ATTESATION_REPORT command can be called while the guest
is running.
Add a QMP interface "query-sev-attestation-report" that can be used
to get the report encoded in base64.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210429170728.24322-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Ram block notifiers are currently not aware of resizes. To properly
handle resizes during migration, we want to teach ram block notifiers about
resizeable ram.
Introduce the basic infrastructure but keep using max_size in the
existing notifiers. Supply the max_size when adding and removing ram
blocks. Also, notify on resizes.
Acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: haxm-team@intel.com
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Wenchao Wang <wenchao.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210429112708.12291-3-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Stop including exec/address-spaces.h in files that don't need it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210416171314.2074665-5-thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
The 'running' argument from VMChangeStateHandler does not require
other value than 0 / 1. Make it a plain boolean.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Message-Id: <20210111152020.1422021-3-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Update the sev_es_enabled() function return value to be based on the SEV
policy that has been specified. SEV-ES is enabled if SEV is enabled and
the SEV-ES policy bit is set in the policy object.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <c69f81c6029f31fc4c52a9f35f1bd704362476a5.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
encrypted and measured. Search the guest firmware for the guest for a
specific GUID that tells Qemu the value of the reset vector to use.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <22db2bfb4d6551aed661a9ae95b4fdbef613ca21.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In prep for AP booting, require the use of in-kernel irqchip support. This
lessens the Qemu support burden required to boot APs.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <e9aec5941e613456f0757f5a73869cdc5deea105.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Provide initial support for SEV-ES. This includes creating a function to
indicate the guest is an SEV-ES guest (which will return false until all
support is in place), performing the proper SEV initialization and
ensuring that the guest CPU state is measured as part of the launch.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <2e6386cbc1ddeaf701547dd5677adf5ddab2b6bd.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When AMD's SEV memory encryption is in use, flash memory banks (which are
initialed by pc_system_flash_map()) need to be encrypted with the guest's
key, so that the guest can read them.
That's abstracted via the kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data() callback in the KVM
state.. except, that it doesn't really abstract much at all.
For starters, the only call site is in code specific to the 'pc'
family of machine types, so it's obviously specific to those and to
x86 to begin with. But it makes a bunch of further assumptions that
need not be true about an arbitrary confidential guest system based on
memory encryption, let alone one based on other mechanisms:
* it assumes that the flash memory is defined to be encrypted with the
guest key, rather than being shared with hypervisor
* it assumes that that hypervisor has some mechanism to encrypt data into
the guest, even though it can't decrypt it out, since that's the whole
point
* the interface assumes that this encrypt can be done in place, which
implies that the hypervisor can write into a confidential guests's
memory, even if what it writes isn't meaningful
So really, this "abstraction" is actually pretty specific to the way SEV
works. So, this patch removes it and instead has the PC flash
initialization code call into a SEV specific callback.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the
launch secret, it cannot access the secret.
Signed-off-by: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20201027170303.47550-1-tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Some typedefs and macros are defined after the type check macros.
This makes it difficult to automatically replace their
definitions with OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE.
Patch generated using:
$ ./scripts/codeconverter/converter.py -i \
--pattern=QOMStructTypedefSplit $(git grep -l '' -- '*.[ch]')
which will split "typdef struct { ... } TypedefName"
declarations.
Followed by:
$ ./scripts/codeconverter/converter.py -i --pattern=MoveSymbols \
$(git grep -l '' -- '*.[ch]')
which will:
- move the typedefs and #defines above the type check macros
- add missing #include "qom/object.h" lines if necessary
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200831210740.126168-9-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200831210740.126168-10-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200831210740.126168-11-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
In some cases, such as if the kvm-amd "sev" module parameter is set
to 0, SEV will be unavailable but query-sev-capabilities will still
return all the information. This tricks libvirt into erroneously
reporting that SEV is available. Check the actual usability of the
feature and return the appropriate error if QEMU cannot use KVM
or KVM cannot use SEV.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The query-sev-capabilities was reporting errors through error_report;
change it to use Error** so that the cause of the failure is clearer.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
AMD SEV will pin all guest memory, mark discarding of RAM broken. At the
time this is called, we cannot have anyone active that relies on discards
to work properly - let's still implement error handling.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200626072248.78761-8-david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
SEVState is contained with SevGuestState. We've now fixed redundancies
and name conflicts, so there's no real point to the nested structure. Just
move all the fields of SEVState into SevGuestState.
This eliminates the SEVState structure, which as a bonus removes the
confusion with the SevState enum.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-10-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The user can explicitly specify a handle via the "handle" property wired
to SevGuestState::handle. That gets passed to the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
ioctl() which may update it, the final value being copied back to both
SevGuestState::handle and SEVState::handle.
AFAICT, nothing will be looking SEVState::handle before it and
SevGuestState::handle have been updated from the ioctl(). So, remove the
field and just use SevGuestState::handle directly.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEVState::policy is set from the final value of the policy field in the
parameter structure for the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START ioctl(). But, AFAICT
that ioctl() won't ever change it from the original supplied value which
comes from SevGuestState::policy.
So, remove this field and just use SevGuestState::policy directly.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-8-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SEVState structure has cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields which are
simply copied from the SevGuestState structure and never changed. Now that
SEVState is embedded in SevGuestState we can just access the original copy
directly.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-7-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SEV code uses a pretty ugly global to access its internal state. Now
that SEVState is embedded in SevGuestState, we can avoid accessing it via
the global in some cases. In the remaining cases use a new global
referencing the containing SevGuestState which will simplify some future
transformations.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently SevGuestState contains only configuration information. For
runtime state another non-QOM struct SEVState is allocated separately.
Simplify things by instead embedding the SEVState structure in
SevGuestState.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-5-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
At the moment this is a purely passive object which is just a container for
information used elsewhere, hence the name. I'm going to change that
though, so as a preliminary rename it to SevGuestState.
That name risks confusion with both SEVState and SevState, but I'll be
working on that in following patches.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-4-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Neither QSevGuestInfo nor SEVState (not to be confused with SevState) is
used anywhere outside target/i386/sev.c, so they might as well live in
there rather than in a (somewhat) exposed header.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-3-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This structure is nothing but an empty wrapper around the parent class,
which by QOM conventions means we don't need it at all.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-2-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The only way object_property_add() can fail is when a property with
the same name already exists. Since our property names are all
hardcoded, failure is a programming error, and the appropriate way to
handle it is passing &error_abort.
Same for its variants, except for object_property_add_child(), which
additionally fails when the child already has a parent. Parentage is
also under program control, so this is a programming error, too.
We have a bit over 500 callers. Almost half of them pass
&error_abort, slightly fewer ignore errors, one test case handles
errors, and the remaining few callers pass them to their own callers.
The previous few commits demonstrated once again that ignoring
programming errors is a bad idea.
Of the few ones that pass on errors, several violate the Error API.
The Error ** argument must be NULL, &error_abort, &error_fatal, or a
pointer to a variable containing NULL. Passing an argument of the
latter kind twice without clearing it in between is wrong: if the
first call sets an error, it no longer points to NULL for the second
call. ich9_pm_add_properties(), sparc32_ledma_realize(),
sparc32_dma_realize(), xilinx_axidma_realize(), xilinx_enet_realize()
are wrong that way.
When the one appropriate choice of argument is &error_abort, letting
users pick the argument is a bad idea.
Drop parameter @errp and assert the preconditions instead.
There's one exception to "duplicate property name is a programming
error": the way object_property_add() implements the magic (and
undocumented) "automatic arrayification". Don't drop @errp there.
Instead, rename object_property_add() to object_property_try_add(),
and add the obvious wrapper object_property_add().
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200505152926.18877-15-armbru@redhat.com>
[Two semantic rebase conflicts resolved]
object_property_set_description() and
object_class_property_set_description() fail only when property @name
is not found.
There are 85 calls of object_property_set_description() and
object_class_property_set_description(). None of them can fail:
* 84 immediately follow the creation of the property.
* The one in spapr_rng_instance_init() refers to a property created in
spapr_rng_class_init(), from spapr_rng_properties[].
Every one of them still gets to decide what to pass for @errp.
51 calls pass &error_abort, 32 calls pass NULL, one receives the error
and propagates it to &error_abort, and one propagates it to
&error_fatal. I'm actually surprised none of them violates the Error
API.
What are we gaining by letting callers handle the "property not found"
error? Use when the property is not known to exist is simpler: you
don't have to guard the call with a check. We haven't found such a
use in 5+ years. Until we do, let's make life a bit simpler and drop
the @errp parameter.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200505152926.18877-8-armbru@redhat.com>
[One semantic rebase conflict resolved]
Several objects implemented their own uint property getters and setters,
despite them being straightforward (without any checks/validations on
the values themselves) and identical across objects. This makes use of
an enhanced API for object_property_add_uintXX_ptr() which offers
default setters.
Some of these setters used to update the value even if the type visit
failed (eg. because the value being set overflowed over the given type).
The new setter introduces a check for these errors, not updating the
value if an error occurred. The error is propagated.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Franciosi <felipe@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
sysemu/sysemu.h is a rather unfocused dumping ground for stuff related
to the system-emulator. Evidence:
* It's included widely: in my "build everything" tree, changing
sysemu/sysemu.h still triggers a recompile of some 1100 out of 6600
objects (not counting tests and objects that don't depend on
qemu/osdep.h, down from 5400 due to the previous two commits).
* It pulls in more than a dozen additional headers.
Split stuff related to run state management into its own header
sysemu/runstate.h.
Touching sysemu/sysemu.h now recompiles some 850 objects. qemu/uuid.h
also drops from 1100 to 850, and qapi/qapi-types-run-state.h from 4400
to 4200. Touching new sysemu/runstate.h recompiles some 500 objects.
Since I'm touching MAINTAINERS to add sysemu/runstate.h anyway, also
add qemu/main-loop.h.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190812052359.30071-30-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[Unbreak OS-X build]
In these multiline messages, there were typos. Fix them -- add a missing
space and remove a superfluous apostrophe.
Inspired by Tom's patch.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-trivial@nongnu.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20190719104118.17735-1-jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The commit referenced below skipped pinning ram device memory when
ram blocks are added, we need to do the same when they're removed.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes: cedc0ad539 ("target/i386: sev: Do not pin the ram device memory region")
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <156320087103.2556.10983987500488190423.stgit@gimli.home>
Reviewed-by: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The RAM device presents a memory region that should be handled
as an IO region and should not be pinned.
In the case of the vfio-pci, RAM device represents a MMIO BAR
and the memory region is not backed by pages hence
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION fails to lock the memory range.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1667249
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20190204222322.26766-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Clean up includes so that osdep.h is included first and headers
which it implies are not included manually.
This commit was created with scripts/clean-includes, with the changes
to the following files manually reverted:
contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user-glib.h
contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user.c
contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user.h
linux-user/mips64/cpu_loop.c
linux-user/mips64/signal.c
linux-user/sparc64/cpu_loop.c
linux-user/sparc64/signal.c
linux-user/x86_64/cpu_loop.c
linux-user/x86_64/signal.c
target/s390x/gen-features.c
tests/migration/s390x/a-b-bios.c
tests/test-rcu-simpleq.c
tests/test-rcu-tailq.c
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20181204172535.2799-1-armbru@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Viktor Prutyanov <viktor.prutyanov@phystech.edu>
The string returned by object_property_get_str() is dynamically allocated.
Fixes: d8575c6c02
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <152231462116.69730.14119625999092384450.stgit@bahia.lan>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest
is ready to run.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory
region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Markus Armbruster
Connor Kuehl
Brijesh Singh
David Hildenbrand
Thomas Huth
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
Tom Lendacky
Paolo Bonzini
David Gibson
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
Eduardo Habkost
Pan Nengyuan
Felipe Franciosi
Jiri Slaby
Alex Williamson
Greg Kurz