The sifive-e34 cpu type is the same as the sifive-e31 with the
single precision floating-point extension enabled.
Signed-off-by: Corey Wharton <coreyw7@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20200313193429.8035-3-coreyw7@fb.com
Message-Id: <20200313193429.8035-3-coreyw7@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
As-per RISC-V H-Extension v0.5 draft, the Stage2 SV32 page table has
12bits of VPN[1] and 10bits of VPN[0]. The additional 2bits in VPN[1]
is required to handle the 34bit intermediate physical address coming
from Stage1 SV32 page table. The 12bits of VPN[1] implies that Stage2
SV32 level-0 page table will be 16KB in size with total 4096 enteries
where each entry maps 4MB of memory (same as Stage1 SV32 page table).
The get_physical_address() function is broken for Stage2 SV32 level-0
page table because it incorrectly computes output physical address for
Stage2 SV32 level-0 page table entry.
The root cause of the issue is that get_physical_address() uses the
"widened" variable to compute level-0 physical address mapping which
changes level-0 mapping size (instead of 4MB). We should use the
"widened" variable only for computing index of Stage2 SV32 level-0
page table.
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-id: 20200330082724.120444-1-anup.patel@wdc.com
Message-Id: <20200330082724.120444-1-anup.patel@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Take the result of stage-1 and stage-2 page table walks and AND the two
protection flags together. This way we require both to set permissions
instead of just stage-2.
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Message-id: 846f1e18f5922d818bc464ec32c144ef314ec724.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com
Message-Id: <846f1e18f5922d818bc464ec32c144ef314ec724.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>
When doing the fist of a two stage lookup (Hypervisor extensions) don't
set the current protection flags from the second stage lookup of the
base address PTE.
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Message-id: 931db85d6890ed4bc2b527fd1011197cd28299aa.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com
Message-Id: <931db85d6890ed4bc2b527fd1011197cd28299aa.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>
The unpack facility is an indication that diagnose 308 subcodes 8-10
are available to the guest. That means, that the guest can put itself
into protected mode.
Once it is in protected mode, the hardware stops any attempt of VM
introspection by the hypervisor.
Some features are currently not supported in protected mode:
* vfio devices
* Migration
* Huge page backings
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-17-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected VMs status storing is not done by QEMU anymore.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-15-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected guests, we need to put the IO emulation results into the
SIDA, so SIE will write them into the guest at the next entry.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-14-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
IO instruction data is routed through SIDAD for protected guests, so
adresses do not need to be checked, as this is kernel memory which is
always available.
Also the instruction data always starts at offset 0 of the SIDAD.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-13-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected guests the IPIB is written/read to/from the SIDA, so we
need those accesses to go through s390_cpu_pv_mem_read/write().
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-12-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Handling of CPU reset and setting of the IPL psw from guest storage at
offset 0 is done by a Ultravisor call. Let's only fetch it if
necessary.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-11-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
SCLP for a protected guest is done over the SIDAD, so we need to use
the s390_cpu_pv_mem_* functions to access the SIDAD instead of guest
memory when reading/writing SCBs.
To not confuse the sclp emulation, we set 0x4000 as the SCCB address,
since the function that injects the sclp external interrupt would
reject a zero sccb address.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-10-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected guests, we need to put the STSI emulation results into
the SIDA, so SIE will write them into the guest at the next entry.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-9-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Protected guests save the instruction control blocks in the SIDA
instead of QEMU/KVM directly accessing the guest's memory.
Let's introduce new functions to access the SIDA.
The memops for doing so are available with KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED, so
let's check for that.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-8-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Protected VMs no longer intercept with code 4 for an instruction
interception. Instead they have codes 104 and 108 for protected
instruction interception and protected instruction notification
respectively.
The 104 mirrors the 4 interception.
The 108 is a notification interception to let KVM and QEMU know that
something changed and we need to update tracking information or
perform specific tasks. It's currently taken for the following
instructions:
* spx (To inform about the changed prefix location)
* sclp (On incorrect SCCB values, so we can inject a IRQ)
* sigp (All but "stop and store status")
* diag308 (Subcodes 0/1)
Of these exits only sclp errors, state changing sigps and diag308 will
reach QEMU. QEMU will do its parts of the job, while the ultravisor
has done the instruction part of the job.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-7-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
The unpack facility provides the means to setup a protected guest. A
protected guest cannot be introspected by the hypervisor or any
user/administrator of the machine it is running on.
Protected guests are encrypted at rest and need a special boot
mechanism via diag308 subcode 8 and 10.
Code 8 sets the PV specific IPLB which is retained separately from
those set via code 5.
Code 10 is used to unpack the VM into protected memory, verify its
integrity and start it.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [Changes
to machine]
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200323083606.24520-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
[CH: fixed up KVM_PV_VM_ -> KVM_PV_]
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Fixes the following coccinelle warnings:
$ spatch --sp-file --verbose-parsing ... \
scripts/coccinelle/remove_local_err.cocci
...
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/ppc/translate_init.inc.c:5213
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/ppc/translate_init.inc.c:5261
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:166
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:167
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:169
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:170
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:171
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:172
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:173
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5787
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5789
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5800
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5801
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5802
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5804
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5805
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5806
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:6329
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/sd/sdhci.c:1133
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:3081
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/net/virtio-net.c:1529
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/riscv/sifive_u.c:468
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./dump/dump.c:1895
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2209
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2215
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2221
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2222
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/replication.c:172
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/replication.c:173
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20200412223619.11284-2-f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
They are part of the IPL process, so let's put them into the ipl
header.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
In commit 41a4bf1fea the added code to set the CNP
field in ID_MMFR4 for the AArch64 'max' CPU had a typo
where it used the wrong variable name, resulting in ID_MMFR4
fields AC2, XNX and LSM being wrong. Fix the typo.
Fixes: 41a4bf1fea
Reported-by: Laurent Desnogues <laurent.desnogues@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Desnogues <laurent.desnogues@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20200422124501.28015-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
If mtmsr L=1 sets MSR[EE] while there is a maskable exception pending,
it does not cause an interrupt. This causes the test case to hang:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-ppc/2019-10/msg00826.html
More recently, Linux reduced the occurance of operations (e.g., rfi)
which stop translation and allow pending interrupts to be processed.
This started causing hangs in Linux boot in long-running kernel tests,
running with '-d int' shows the decrementer stops firing despite DEC
wrapping and MSR[EE]=1.
https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/208301.html
The cause is the broken mtmsr L=1 behaviour, which is contrary to the
architecture. From Power ISA v3.0B, p.977, Move To Machine State Register,
Programming Note states:
If MSR[EE]=0 and an External, Decrementer, or Performance Monitor
exception is pending, executing an mtmsrd instruction that sets
MSR[EE] to 1 will cause the interrupt to occur before the next
instruction is executed, if no higher priority exception exists
Fix this by handling L=1 exactly the same way as L=0, modulo the MSR
bits altered.
The confusion arises from L=0 being "context synchronizing" whereas L=1
is "execution synchronizing", which is a weaker semantic. However this
is not a relaxation of the requirement that these exceptions cause
interrupts when MSR[EE]=1 (e.g., when mtmsr executes to completion as
TCG is doing here), rather it specifies how a pipelined processor can
have multiple instructions in flight where one may influence how another
behaves.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@ozlabs.org>
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200414111131.465560-1-npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Tested-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Since we now use a GByteArray, we can not use stfl_p() directly.
Introduce the gdb_get_float32() helper to load a float32 register.
Fixes: a010bdbe71 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200414163853.12164-2-philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-14-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Introduce gdb_get_zeroes() to fill a GByteArray with zeroes.
Fixes: a010bdbe71 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414102427.7459-1-philmd@redhat.com>
[AJB: used slightly more gliby set_size approach]
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-13-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
We should only pass in gdb_get_reg16() with the GByteArray* object
itself, no need to shift. Without this patch, gdb remote attach will
crash QEMU:
(gdb) target remote :1234
Remote debugging using :1234
Remote communication error. Target disconnected.: Connection reset by peer.
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -m 1G -smp 4 ... -s
ERROR:qemu/gdbstub.c:1843:handle_read_all_regs: assertion failed: (len == gdbserver_state.mem_buf->len)
Bail out! ERROR:qemu/gdbstub.c:1843:handle_read_all_regs: assertion failed: (len == gdbserver_state.mem_buf->len)
Fixes: a010bdbe71 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200409164954.36902-3-peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-12-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Since a010bdbe71 the gdbstub API takes a GByteArray*. Unfortunately
we forgot to update the gdb_get_reg*() calls. Do it now.
Fixes: a010bdbe71 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Reported-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200409172509.4078-1-philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-11-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Patch acb9f95a7c "i386: Fix GCC warning with snprintf when HAX
is enabled" replaced Windows device names with posix device
names. Revert this.
Fixes: acb9f95a7c "i386: Fix GCC warning with snprintf when HAX is enabled"
Signed-off-by: Volker Rümelin <vr_qemu@t-online.de>
Message-Id: <20200322210211.29603-1-vr_qemu@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Coverity reported a missing fall through comment, add it.
Fixes: e5918d7d7f ("target/rx: TCG translation")
Reported-by: Coverity (CID 1422222 MISSING_BREAK)
Suggested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200403184419.28556-1-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Rather than dynamically allocate, and risk failing to free
when we longjmp out of the translator, allocate the maximum
buffer size based on the maximum supported instruction length.
Suggested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Dynamically allocating a new structure within the DisasContext can
potentially leak as we can longjmp out of the translation loop (see
test_phys_mem). The proper fix would be to use static allocation
within the DisasContext but as the Xtensa translator imports it's code
from elsewhere I leave that as an exercise for the maintainer.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200403191150.863-6-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
The KVM FWNMI capability should be enabled with the "ibm,nmi-register"
rtas call. Although MCEs from KVM will be delivered as architected
interrupts to the guest before "ibm,nmi-register" is called, KVM has
different behaviour depending on whether the guest has enabled FWNMI
(it attempts to do more recovery on behalf of a non-FWNMI guest).
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200325142906.221248-2-npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
An old comment in get_phys_addr_lpae() claims that the code does not
support the different format TCR for VTCR_EL2. This used to be true
but it is not true now (in particular the aa64_va_parameters() and
aa32_va_parameters() functions correctly handle the different
register format by checking whether the mmu_idx is Stage2).
Remove the out of date parts of the comment.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200331143407.3186-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Our implementation of the PSTATE.PAN bit incorrectly cleared all
access permission bits for privileged access to memory which is
user-accessible. It should only affect the privileged read and write
permissions; execute permission is dealt with via XN/PXN instead.
Fixes: 81636b70c2
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200330170651.20901-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
While support for parsing ieee_half in the XML description was added
to gdb in 2019 (a6d0f249) there is no easy way for the gdbstub to know
if the gdb end will understand it. Disable it for now and allow older
gdbs to successfully connect to the default -cpu max SVE enabled
QEMUs.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200402143913.24005-1-alex.bennee@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Commit 048c95163b ("target/i386: work around KVM_GET_MSRS bug for
secondary execution controls") added a workaround for KVM pre-dating
commit 6defc591846d ("KVM: nVMX: include conditional controls in /dev/kvm
KVM_GET_MSRS") which wasn't setting certain available controls. The
workaround uses generic CPUID feature bits to set missing VMX controls.
It was found that in some cases it is possible to observe hosts which
have certain CPUID features but lack the corresponding VMX control.
In particular, it was reported that Azure VMs have RDSEED but lack
VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING; attempts to enable this feature
bit result in QEMU abort.
Resolve the issue but not applying the workaround when we don't have
to. As there is no good way to find out if KVM has the fix itself, use
95c5c7c77c ("KVM: nVMX: list VMX MSRs in KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST") instead
as these [are supposed to] come together.
Fixes: 048c95163b ("target/i386: work around KVM_GET_MSRS bug for secondary execution controls")
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200331162752.1209928-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The sequence of instructions exposes an issue:
sti
hlt
Interrupts cannot be delivered to hvf after hlt instruction cpu because
HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK is set just before hlt is handled and never reset
after moving instruction pointer beyond hlt.
So, after hvf_vcpu_exec() returns, CPU thread gets locked up forever in
qemu_wait_io_event() (cpu_thread_is_idle() evaluates inhibition
flag and considers the CPU idle if the flag is set).
Cc: Cameron Esfahani <dirty@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Message-Id: <20200328174411.51491-1-r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The cpu number reporting is handled by KVM and QEMU only fills in the
VM name, uuid and other values.
Unfortunately KVM doesn't report reserved cpus and doesn't even know
they exist until the are created via the ioctl.
So let's fix up the cpu values after KVM has written its values to the
3.2.2 sysib. To be consistent, we use the same code to retrieve the cpu
numbers as the STSI TCG code in target/s390x/misc_helper.c:HELPER(stsi).
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200331110123.3774-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Current Icelake-Server CPU model lacks all the features enumerated by
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Add them, so that guest of "Icelake-Server" can see all of them.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200316095605.12318-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
The CPUID level need to be set to 0x14 manually on old
machine-type if Intel PT is enabled in guest. E.g. the
CPUID[0].EAX(level)=7 and CPUID[7].EBX[25](intel-pt)=1 when the
Qemu with "-machine pc-i440fx-3.1 -cpu qemu64,+intel-pt" parameter.
Some Intel PT capabilities are exposed by leaf 0x14 and the
missing capabilities will cause some MSRs access failed.
This patch add a warning message to inform the user to extend
the CPUID level.
Suggested-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <1584031686-16444-1-git-send-email-luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
If the system is numa configured the pkg_offset needs
to be adjusted for EPYC cpu models. Fix it calling the
model specific handler.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <158396725589.58170.16424607815207074485.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
The APIC ID is decoded based on the sequence sockets->dies->cores->threads.
This works fine for most standard AMD and other vendors' configurations,
but this decoding sequence does not follow that of AMD's APIC ID enumeration
strictly. In some cases this can cause CPU topology inconsistency.
When booting a guest VM, the kernel tries to validate the topology, and finds
it inconsistent with the enumeration of EPYC cpu models. The more details are
in the bug https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1728166.
To fix the problem we need to build the topology as per the Processor
Programming Reference (PPR) for AMD Family 17h Model 01h, Revision B1
Processors. The documentation is available from the bugzilla Link below.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
It is also available at
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55570-B1_PUB.zip
Here is the text from the PPR.
Operating systems are expected to use Core::X86::Cpuid::SizeId[ApicIdSize], the
number of least significant bits in the Initial APIC ID that indicate core ID
within a processor, in constructing per-core CPUID masks.
Core::X86::Cpuid::SizeId[ApicIdSize] determines the maximum number of cores
(MNC) that the processor could theoretically support, not the actual number of
cores that are actually implemented or enabled on the processor, as indicated
by Core::X86::Cpuid::SizeId[NC].
Each Core::X86::Apic::ApicId[ApicId] register is preset as follows:
• ApicId[6] = Socket ID.
• ApicId[5:4] = Node ID.
• ApicId[3] = Logical CCX L3 complex ID
• ApicId[2:0]= (SMT) ? {LogicalCoreID[1:0],ThreadId} : {1'b0,LogicalCoreID[1:0]}
The new apic id encoding is enabled for EPYC and EPYC-Rome models.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <158396724913.58170.3539083528095710811.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Add a boolean variable use_epyc_apic_id_encoding in X86CPUDefinition.
This will be set if this cpu model needs to use new EPYC based
apic id encoding.
Override the handlers with EPYC based handlers if use_epyc_apic_id_encoding
is set. This will be done in x86_cpus_init.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <158396723514.58170.14825482171652019765.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Use the new functions from topology.h and delete the unused code. Given the
sockets, nodes, cores and threads, the new functions generate apic id for EPYC
mode. Removes all the hardcoded values.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <158396722151.58170.8031705769621392927.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>